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Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for
Urban Growth
If America's cities are to accommodate the increased urban popula-
tion of the future without intensifying present disorders or giving rise
to massive new ones, new tools must be developed to guide and control
urban growth. In this Note, the authors examine the genesis and im-
pact of disorderly urban growth. On the basis of the land use experiences
in the United States and other countries, they suggest that one method
of meeting the pressing need for ordering urban growth is to establish
land banks: public bodies authorized to acquire, hold, and dispose of
land in and around their localities. The authors then explore the organi-
zational, legal, and financial considerations that would be involved in
establishing such land banks.
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE CONTINUING TREK from a rural to an urban nation,
America has come to the crossroads in the use of its urban re-
sources. The undisciplined, sporadic, and haphazard character of
urbanization has spawned complex problems at every level of gov-
ernment and has imposed huge costs upon the private sector. Slums
and blight have engulfed large portions of our major cities; violence,
obsolescence, pollution, traffic congestion, and inadequate schools
characterize their cores. In the suburbs, rising taxes, chaotic land
use patterns, strip commercial development, and inadequate parks
and open space are common. The suburbs of yesterday, the so-
called "gray areas," are gradually becoming the slums of today as
the social and economic infirmities of the city push outward to con-
sume even larger areas. Beyond the suburbs, unused land and land
devoted to such nonintensive uses as agriculture is being laced with
scattered ribbons of homes and businesses, stretching finger-like
along rural roadways and country lanes. This disorderly and dis-
functional pattern of urban development, aptly called "urban
sprawl," has not only produced an unpleasant environment, but has
imposed heavy costs on urban communities and generated marked
inequities in the distribution of these costs.
In the face of these resolute trends, it is becoming apparent that
existing methods of regulating land use are inadequate to cope with
the insidious nature of urban sprawl. The magnitude of the prob-
lem is reflected by the prospect that from now until the year 2000,
the United States population will grow from 208 million to be-
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tween 280 and 305 million,' and all of the increase will probably
occur where there is now a town or city.2
The actual demand for land will, in fact, probably be more in-
tense than the projected increase in urban population alone would
indicate. As man's income grows, all else being equal, his demand
for land will increase. He will consequently desire larger homes,
more attached open space, and additional public services.3  Assum-
ing then that per capita income will continue to rise, it seems cer-
tain that demand for urban land per inhabitant will increase.4
In a purely physical sense, there is enough space in the United
States to accommodate all the urban centers that can possibly be en-
visaged.5 The impending demand for more land, therefore, reveals
not a physical problem, but rather a managerial and financial one.
The congestion endemic to our cities and the ubiquitous sprawl in
the suburbs are primarily the result of inept management, not lack
of space.
One method of managing urban growth and promoting orderly
urban development is to establish land banks - public bodies which,
by acquiring land in the path of anticipated urban expansion and
I Rosenthal, Younger Women Plan Big Decline in Rate of Births, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 1972, at 1, col. 8. Recent Census Bureau statistics indicate a sharp reduc-
tion in the population growth rate. The average number of children expected by wives
between the ages of 18 to 24 dropped from 2.9 to 2.4 between 1967 and 1971. If the
rate of 2.4 children per wife remains constant, then in the year 2000 the nation's popu-
lation would be approximately 280 million rather than the 305 million persons antici-
pated if the 2.9 rate had persisted. In order for zero population growth to be achieved,
however, the rate must decrease to 2.1 children per wife. Id.
2
M. CLAWSON, R. HELD & C. STODDARD, LAND FOR THE FUTURE 111 (1960).
3 W. LETWIN, MUNICIPAL LAND BANKS: LAND RESERVE POLICY FOR URBAN
DEVELOPMENT 6 (1969).
4 Indeed, between 1950 and 1960, the ratio of land to people in American cities
rose markedly. Whereas population rose by 30 percent during this decade, built up land
expanded by 75 percent. Moreover, 15 major metropolitan areas more than doubled
their urbanized areas in the space of 10 years. In 40 out of 46 major metropolitan
areas, population density declined between 1950 and 1960. J. DE TOURES, ECO-
NOMIC DIMENSIONS OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 14 (National Industrial Con-
ference Board, Technical Paper No. 18, 1968). But note de Toures' doubts as to the
persistence of this trend. Id. at 18.
The automobile has been a key factor in this dynamic growth pattern. Introduc-
tion of the automobile extended the effective, or available area of metropolitan centers
from about 700 square miles in 1940 (when the 15 mile-per-hour trolley prevailed
as the mode of intra-urban transportation) to about 2800 square miles today (when the
commuting speed is estimated to be 30 miles per hour). See H. BLUMENFELD, THE
MODERN METROPOLIS 55-66 (1967), cited in W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 8.
5 If, for the purpose of illustration, urban land is considered to be all land in set-
tled places of at least 1,000 population, then it still constituted less than two per cent
of all acreage in the 50 states in 1964. G. MILGRAM, U.S. LAND PRICES - DIREC-
TIONS AND DYNAMICS 15 (Prepared for the consideration of the Nat'l Comm'n on
Urban Problems, Research Report No. 13, 1968).
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keeping it free from premature development, can effectively control
the pace and direction of urban growth. As the city expands, land
in the bank's reserve closest to the city's core would be continually
sold or leased to private developers, while land at the urban fringe
would simultaneously be acquired or rented in order to immunize it
from premature development. Operated properly, the land bank
would minimize or eliminate sprawl. Other subsidiary aims could
be pursued in accordance with the policies of the particular com-
munity that the land bank served. Redeveloping the inner city, re-
ducing the price of urban land on the open market, curbing private
land speculation, providing for future public uses, and subsidizing
certain private or public uses by selling or leasing below the cost
of the acquisition are among the array of possible subsidiary ob-
jectives.
The concept of land banking is hardly new. Several European
countries have successfully operated land banks in various forms
for many years. Although local governments in America, with the
exception of Puerto Rico, have never maintained land reserves as a
means of guiding and controlling urban development, lands have
been publicly acquired in advance of need for schools, highways,
and industrial facilities and the Federal Government has always
maintained a general land reserve (i.e., the public domain). In
addition, several prominent federal commissions have proposed land
banking as a technique for combatting various urban problems.'
While the literature of land economics and urban planning is
replete with suggestions for land banking,7 there are no complete,
in-depth efforts to elaborate what would be involved in establishing
and operating a land bank. The purpose of this Note is to set up
a framework for the kinds of decisions that would be involved in
developing a working model for public land banking and to discuss
the major problems inherent in land banking in the American legal
context. It begins with a critique of present American land use con-
trols; then, before elaborating on the operational and legal aspects
6 See notes 37, 143-52 infra & accompanying text.
7 For a list of some of these proposals for large-scale public land acquisition as a
means of controlling urban growth, see the bibliographical note contained in Reps,
'"The Future of American Planning: Requiem or Renascence?", in PLANNING, 1967
SELECTED PAPERS PROM THE 1967 ASPO NATIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE 47,
59-65 (1967). See also M. CLAwsoN, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE
UNITED STATES 355-63 (1970); G. EDWARDS, LAND, PEOPLE, AND POLICY (1969); G.
MILGRAM, supra note 5; Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
36-50 (1971). The most extensive analysis of land banking to date is W. LETWIN,
supra note 3, which primarily follows an economic orientation.
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of land banking, the Note surveys foreign experiences with similar
schemes, American land acquisition programs, and recent American
land use proposals.
II. THE NEED FOR ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT
We have been the most prodigal of people with land, and for years
we wasted it with impunity. There was so much of it, and no mat-
ter how we fouled it, there was always more over the next hill, or
so it seemed. W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE 1 (1968).
A. The Genesis of Urban Sprawl
Public attitudes regarding the proper use of land arise from the
polymorphous social, economic, ethical, and philosophical myths and
persuasions about the true purpose of land that have developed
throughout our history. In America, democracy began as a system
in which ownership of land was intimately identified with freedom.8
One of the most tenacious ideas in American history was that every
man who wanted to become a small land owner or farmer should
be entitled to do so, even if he could not afford to buy the land out-
right with his own resources.9 This concept of land ownership was
steeped in the Jeffersonian belief that society would be served best
if each individual landowner had undisturbed freedom.' 0 Conse-
quently, few restrictions were imposed on one's right to do what-
ever he pleased with the land he owned. The concept of agrarian
imperialism so pervaded American thought that little concern was
expressed regarding the use or misuse of land. Even in the early
1900's, when industrial exploitation invaded the public domain, the
institution of land ownership was still girded with the legal rules
which earlier had led Blackstone to conclude that private rights in
property were impregnable against invasion "even for the general
good of the whole community.""
8 See generally, R. HoFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 1-38
(1948).
9 In 1776, Thomas Jefferson averred that "tr]he people who will migrate to the
westward ... will be a people little able to pay taxes .... By selling the lands to them,
you will disgust them and cause an avulsion of them from the common union. They
will settle the land in spite of everybody.'" R. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE
20 (1942). After tempestuous class and sectional struggles over land legislation, Con-
gress passed the Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, which gave up
to 160 acres to anyone who would settle and make improvements on it. Id. at 206-07.
'
0 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 8, at 38.
11 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (1897).
See also Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CITIES AND SPACE 176 (L.
Wingo ed. 1963). Interestingly, all the great texts on property concentrated on the
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Accompanying the urbanization and industrialization of the 20th
century, came what appeared to be a diminishing faith in the un-
bridled superiority of private interests. Zoning, a planning device
by which property rights were ostensibly subordinated to the health,
safety, and welfare of the community, however, became popular
only when it became touted as a method of stabilizing and protect-
ing property values, while imposing nominal restrictions on areas
portending speculative profit.'3 The practice of zoning, therefore,
has been substantially different from the theory, 4 and the advent of
modern land use controls has done little to dampen individual free-
dom and initiative in the use and exploitation of land.
This fundamentally laissez-faire policy of land use which char-
acterized America's historical development still predominates in our
cities today. Land in the area surrounding the urban core,' 5 which
should be developed, is kept vacant by speculators' 6 who value their
land at an optimistic future price in anticipation of high profits.
transfer of rights and the creation of estates and "left to others, primarily writers in torts,
the task of dealing scantily with land use, which the property writers treated as analogous
to assault and battery and other personal injuries." Dunham, Property, City Planning,
and Liberty, in LAw AND LAND 30 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
1 2 Zoning's potential for class stratification was prophetically identified in the 1924
district court opinion of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio
1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The district court opined that the ordinance was a
taking of property without just compensation, and declared:
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to
place all the property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a strait-
jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate the mode of
living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In the last analysis, the result
to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them accord-
ing to their income or situation in life. The true reason why some persons
live in a mansion and others in a shack, why some live in a single-family
dwelling and others in a double-family dwelling, why some live in a two-
family dwelling and others in an apartment, or why some live in a well-kept
apartment and others in a tenement, is primarily economic. Id. at 316.
It has taken 30 years for our society to belatedly agree with the district court. See
Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the
End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9, 11.
'
3 See R. WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCriON IN URBAN GOVERNMENT 59
(1941).
14 Single family areas were secured from the intrusions of undesirable uses, but
multifamily, commercial, and industrial areas were commonly overzoned. New York's
zoning ordinance, for example, could provide enough business and industrial space for
a city of 340,000,000 people. Id. at 11.
15 Much can be said regarding what is and is not included in the definitions of a city,
metropolitan area, urban core and the like. For a discussion of this terminology, see
M. CLAWSON, R. HELD & C. STODDARD, supra note 2, at 60-63, 511-14.
16 Since land prices may fluctuate greatly, everyone who owns, buys, or sells land,
with or without improvements, is technically a speculator. But those who enter the
land market expressly to capitalize on these fluctuations are the ones usually referred
to pejoratively as speculators. See M. CLAWSON, supra note 7, at 134-35.
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As a result of the artificial shortage of land 7 thus created, devel-
opers"8 - residential ones at first - are forced to go beyond the
areas of logical development to scattered and isolated locations on
the urban fringe where land can be obtained at reasonable prices.
Consumers, in the true American ethos, are willing to drive a bit
further to achieve more land for less money - particularly where
expressways and freeways are available to maximize their "auto-
mobility" and allow them commuter access to their jobs in the city.
Eventually, businesses also locate further out to maximize their re-
turns and municipal government establishes a full complement of
public services. This dynamic process of "leapfrogging" over ex-
pensive, close-in land to less expensive land on the periphery, leaves
gaps near the core and creates a sporadic pattern of development
around the fringe,'9 a pattern which has been termed "urban
sprawl." 0
The low population density which characterizes sprawl produces
inefficient resource allocations, as well as impairing the aesthetic
aspects of the metropolis. As land is divided and subdivided for
scattered, small-scale development, irreplacable natural and recrea-
tional resources are unnecessarily consumed. Basic services, such
as water supply and sewage removal, must be extended over great
distances, resulting in higher per capita costs for these services.2'
Existing roads prove inadequate to accommodate newly scattered
populations commuting into the increasingly distant city."2 Schools
17 This shortage is "artificial" in the sense that it is created by the speculator's
withholding of land from the market, rather than by an absolute physical absence of
land.
In a revealing analysis of the undeveloped areas left behind by urban sprawl, one
writer concludes: "A considerable part of the area of many major cities is undeveloped.
Unimproved land typically makes up about one-third of all private holdings, or more
than one-fifth of the total area of cities of 100,000 plus." A. MANVEL, LAND USE
IN 106 LARGE CITIES 19 (Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Report No. 12,
1968). Even in New York City, whose percentage of vacant land is below the national
average, undeveloped land amounts to 12.5 percent. Id. at n. 35.
18 In practice, several persons or firms - land assembler, broker, site planner,
builder, subcontractor and sales agent - will often work together to carry out some
or all of the processes herein ascribed to the developer.
19 The urban fringe is the "point where existing houses or current construction
stops .... " A. SCHMID, CONVERTING LAND FROM RURAL TO URBAN USES 29 (1968).
In practice, of course, this "point" will generally be a transitional area of some breadth.
Id. at 29.
20 For an account of "sprawl in action," see W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE
(1970).
21 Alternatively, if separate new public services are provided by installing new
plants and utility facilities, high costs will be encountered because of the diseconomies
of small-scale operations. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 15.2 2 See F. BOSSELMAN, ALTERNATIVES TO URBAN SPRAWL: LEGAL GUIDELINES
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also prove inadequate to handle the increased suburban population.
Consequently, new schools and new roads must be constructed and
local residents must bear additional taxes.3
The additional costs that are generated in the wake of sprawl
are not imposed solely upon those who move beyond the fringe, but
rather upon the community as a whole. For example, a recent study
of one "leapfrog" subdivision development estimated that 40 per-
cent of the added monetary costs had been born by the general pub-
lic, and 60 percent by residents of the subdivision itself.2
Moreover, the social costs to the urban population are even
higher than the monetary ones that are incurred. Haphazard urban
growth has led to a widespread pattern of affluent suburbs surround-
ing a poverty-ridden city core. In most metropolitan areas, racial
minorities and the poor are either intentionally or unintentionally
excluded from new developments outside the city. 5 Unable to
afford outlying property, the poor are condemned to the urban
ghettoes, which become even more overcrowded to meet natural
population increases. And as businesses and industry flee the city,
municipalities are left with a shrinking tax base which proves inade-
quate to maintain a high level of municipal services, or to stem the
tide of urban deterioration.
What is dear from these patterns of sprawl, then, is the need
for orderly development - that is, development which conforms
closely to optimal patterns of land use. Quite simply, the argument
for orderly urban development stems from one fact: urban sprawl
and disorderly development are extraordinarily and unnecessarily
costly.
B. The Inadequacies of Existing Land Use Controls
and the Alternative of Land Banking
Zoning, the workhorse of American land use control, has proven
inadequate and often inimical to the task of ordering urban
growth." Comprehensive planning for the development of urban
FOR GOVERNMvIENTAL ACTION 6 (Prepared for the consideration of the Nat'l Comm'n
on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 15, 1968).
23 Id,
24 R. BAHL, A BLUEGRASS LEAPFROG (1963) (Lexington Bureau of Business Re-
search, University of Kentucky), in D. SHOUP & R. MACK, ADVANCE LAND ACQUI-
SrON BY LOCAL GOVERNMaNTS 101 (1968). See generally, M. CLAWSON, supra
note 7, at 159-62.
25 See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DIsORDERs 118-21
(1968).
26While growth and development is also greatly affected by many other govern-
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areas requires that planning instruments be sufficiently flexible to
take into account the forces operating in today's urban land market.
Traditional zoning has not provided this requisite flexibility.
Zoning is basically an exercise of the police power whereby a
government body restricts the use of land by appropriate regulation
and without compensation to the owner for the purpose of promot-
ing the health, safety, morals, and welfare of some segment of the
community.27 Created as a means of strengthening the institution
of private property in the face of rapid and unsettling changes in
the 1920's, 2' zoning's primary objectives were: (1) protection of
property values by requiring uniformity in each district;21 (2) ex-
clusion of dangerous and nuisance uses from residential districts; 30
and (3) prevention of the overexploitation of land.31
When zoning was originally conceived, urban land uses seemed
to be compartmentalized into a definable scheme. The typical ordi-
nance of the 1920's divided the municipality into three zones -
residential (single-family), commercial, and unrestricted - ex-
pressed in separate sets of maps dealing with use, height, and land
coverage. No attempt was made to cure past or existing evils by
demolition or removal to other areas. Instead, zoning was used
only to impose some sort of rational plan for future building. Its
proponents expected that once zones were established and guidelines
promulgated, every use would be segregated into its appropriate land
area32 and nonconforming uses would disappear. 33  Nonconforming
mental actions and ordinances such as building and housing codes, licensing ordinances,
tax and assessment policy, etc., the actual development of new areas is directly regulated
only by zoning and, to a lesser extent, subdivision regulation.
27 A few decisions have invalidated zoning regulations as being so restrictive that
they constituted an actual taking for which compensation must be paid. See, e.g.,
Caudill v. Milford, 10 Ohio Misc. 1, 225 N.E.2d 302 (1967). The restrictiveness of a
regulation is evaluated by taking into consideration such factors as surrounding uses
and the reasonable return on property values.
2 8 See J. DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1962).
New York City is generally credited with enacting the first comprehensive zoning
ordinance (N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW art. 2-A, § 20(24)-(25) (McKinney 1968) (effective
1917) in 1916. See C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 148 (1959). The ordinance
came about because a group of Fifth Avenue merchants did not want to see factories
blight the character of their area. W. WHYrE, supra note 20, at 40.29 Dukeminier, Boards of Adjustment: The Problem Re-examined, 14 ZONING DI-
GEST 361, 364 (1962).
30 R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 4-5 (1966).
31 S. SUSSNA, LAND USE CONTROL 6 (Urban Land Institute Research Monograph
No. 17, 1970).
3 2 The concept that all urban uses could be isolated into appropriate land areas
seems to have been derived from the law of nuisance. While the Supreme Court in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), disclaimed nuisance as the predicate
of zoning's constitutionality, Justice Sutherland's famous aphorism shows the close con-
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uses, however, have persisted almost a half-century since zoning has
become common.34 Moreover, the problem has been intensified by
the development of new methods of mass building production,
which in turn have created uses which could not have been pre-
dicted in the 1920's and 30's when many existing zoning ordinances
were adopted.
In the rare instances in which zoning schemes were flexible
enough to permit subtle differentiation in land uses which developed
in densely settled cities, the actual administration of the zoning regu-
lations failed to cope with the rapid changes in urban growth pat-
terns that have occurred in the last quarter of a century 5 Severe
limitations have been imposed by the length of time it takes to
change or amend a zoning ordinance and because zoning itself pre-
supposes stability and predictability in the system. Moreover, boards
of appeal, empowered by enabling laws and local ordinances to vary
the application of the zoning ordinance in certain situations through
the issuance of variances and special exceptions, have failed to per-
form a creative, rather than a merely responsive function. Their
failure to do so can be attributed to the fact that board members
are often appointed by local executive authority on the basis of po-
litical considerations, rather than on the basis of expertise in land
use planning or any other useful qualification.36 Because of these
administrative deficiencies, spot zoning, though legally prohibited,
nection: "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place - like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. at 388.
33 In the early days of zoning, Edward Basset, the "father" of modem planning,
exhorted: "Zoning has sought to safeguard the future, in the expectation that time will
repair the mistakes of the past." E. BASS=TT, ZONING: THE LAws, ADMINISTRATION
AND COURT DECISIONS DURING THE FIRsT TWENTY YEARS 105 (1936).
34 Provisions requiring the "amortization" of nonconforming uses over a specified
period of time are becoming more common. However, modern zoning ordinances
generally limit amortization to open uses involving no substantial structures, to uses
deemed especially objectionable like auto wrecking, junkyards, and coal storage dumps,
and to heavy service establishments not designed for such use. M Hershman, A
Leader Looks at Land Use Controls 39 (paper presented to the Association of Life In-
surance Counsel, May 9, 1966 at White Sulphur Springs, Md.). Such amortization
provisions raise perplexing constitutional issues. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Gage, 127
Cal. App.2d 442,274 P.2d 34 (1954).
3 5 See Sullivan, Flexibility and the Rule of Law in American Zoning Administra-
tion, in LAw AND LAND 130 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
3 6 Zoning cognoscente Richard Babcock has described the administration of zon-
ing thusly:
Stripped of all planning jargon, zoning administration is exposed as a process
under which isolated social and political units engage in highly emotional al-
tercations over the use of land, most of which are settled by crude tribal adap-
tations of medieval trial by fire, and a few of which are concluded by con-
fused ad hoc injunctions of bewildered courts. W. WHnR, supra note 20,
at 40-41.
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has crept into zoning ordinances through the indiscriminate or un-
sophisticated granting of variances. Although the practice of grant-
ing variances was originally designed to give the system flexibility
and to cope with unfairness, its misuse has significantly weakened
the basis of the system.
Zoning's ineffectiveness in accommodating the rapidity of urban
change largely lies in the fact that it is a prospective instrument.
As traditionally conceived, zoning was intended not to directly alter
existing land allocations, but merely to guide future land use deci-
sions in a way that would encourage those uses which complement
one another and to preclude those which conflict. Zoning is predi-
cated on the incorrect assumptions that long-range trends affecting
land use may be foreseen well in advance and adequately provided
for by the local legislature and that land use "mistakes" which
preceeded enactment would disappear. Because these assumptions
are incompatible with the reality of urban evolution, imperfections
are inevitable in any zoning ordinance. Another factor which con-
tributes to the ineffectiveness of zoning in ordering and controlling
urban growth is the inability of zoning to operate as a positive force.
While zoning can preclude undesirable uses of land, it cannot com-
pel, or even encourage desirable land uses, nor can it control the
timing of development.
A more effective way to combat urban sprawl and promote
orderly development is to ensure the non-use of land for an indefi-
nite period of time by acquiring or leasing the land. The entity
overseeing this procedure would then have the opportunity to ob-
serve market forces in action so that it could develop or dispose of
the land at a time appropriate for development and with use re-
strictions consonant with a current master plan for the area. Such
is the essence of land banking.
When land is acquired by the bank, it will invariably be un-
ready for use. While in reserve, the land will be reparcelled,
cleared, provided with necessary public utilities, and otherwise be
prepared for development. These changes will be effected by the
land bank or other governmental bodies to reflect demographic
changes, fluctuations in per capita income, prices, and other variables
over which the traditional planning devices have little or no control.
The advantages of land banking as compared to zoning and other
traditional land use controls are many. The foremost advantage, of
course, is that ownership of the land by the land bank permits the
implementation of comprehensive land use plans that would other-
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wise be impossible. As the Report of the Land Committee to the
National Resources Planning Board said over 30 years ago:
[N]o method of land use control can be as effective as outright
ownership of the land involved. A landowner may resist the pres-
sure of taxation or the lure of subsidy; the city fathers may grant
too many exceptions to the zoning ordinance or master plan; the
budget may not allow for enough inspectors to enforce the build-
ing and sanitary codes; all attempts at enforcement are subject to
litigation and delay; but if government itself owns the land, its con-
trol is absolute. Whether or not this control is intelligently used
in the public interest depends on the extent to which American
cities develop adequate plans and procedures to prevent abuse; it
does not bear on the potential effectiveness of this type of land-use
control.3T
Land ownership could also make public officials more dearly
responsible for the economic consequences of restricting land use.
By giving the public an economic stake in the future uses of its
land, officials would be compelled to weigh closely the costs and
benefits of restrictions on land they propose to sell or lease.
The added control which comes with ownership would permit
planning agencies a greater degree of supervision over the develop-
ment and use of any parcel of land. Also, special restrictions en-
forceable by contract could be established for different parcels of
land. These controls and restrictions would be imposed on the dis-
posal of the land, as is done in urban renewal contracts.38
Land banking could effect more flexibility in governmental con-
trol not only through restrictions imposed on disposition of land
from its reserve, but also through the selection of parcels to be
brought into the reserve. The most effective manner of eliminating
nonconforming uses, for example, is simply to acquire the incon-
gruous parcel and redevelop it within the reserve to conform to its
zoned use.
In sum, a land bank would provide for more sensitive regulation
of land uses - regulation more adaptable over time and more dis-
criminating in the particular use ultimately established at a particu-
lar site - than is possible with traditional controls. Although land
banking is not intended as a replacement for traditional schemes of
a7 U.S. NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BD., PUBLIC LAND AcQUISITION, PART II:
URBAN LANDs 12 (1941).
3 8 See generally Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 732 (1960); THE NAT'L HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW
PROJECT, GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING, REDEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING PROGRAMS
ch. III, pt 1, at 141-45 (1969).
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land use control, its integration into existing planning and regula-
tory systems would create a more effective total system.
III. THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE WITH LAND BANKING
A number of foreign governments have utilized a variety of land
banking techniques since the beginning of the 20th century. Munic-
ipalities in Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Israel have en-
tered the market to buy land, hold it, and sell or lease it with a view
toward controlling land speculation, making land available at low
cost for public uses, and guiding the development of new areas in
conformity with well-conceived master plans. Because of the differ-
ing political, social, and economic institutions and traditions which
determine a country's land use policies, one country's land use ex-
perience is not directly applicable outside national boundaries. Cer-
tain similarities in the experiences among these countries, however,
are at least illustrative both of the kinds of policy objectives that a
land bank can accomplish and of the means for accomplishing them.
A. Sweden
Preeminent among the efforts at public land banking has been
the development and expansion of Stockholm, Sweden. A policy
of large-scale land purchases around the city, beginning at the turn
of the century, has enabled Stockholm to shape its physical destiny
in a remarkably effective way.39 Eighteen superbly planned new
communities, each with a population of 250,000, have been built on
land acquired by the land bank.40  Some of the acquired land was
held for as long as 25 years and only developed after mass transpor-
tation and other public facilities were available.4 '
39 A rarity in planning, the 1967 land use map of Stockholm is virtually identical
to the 1952 general development plan which called for the creation of a series of
separate and defined satellite communities. Stockholm's director of planning and
building control has attributed the city's success in planning its physical, economic,
and social development directly to its land banking program. Sidenbladh, Stockholm:
A Planned City, SCIENTIFIc AMERIcAN, Sept. 1965, at 106-08.
4 0 See D. SHOUP & R. MACK, ADVANcE LAND AcQuIsITioN BY LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS 106-08 (1968).
4 1 A determination by the city council in 1941 that future development in the
Stockholm region would be directed along the lines of a proposed underground rail-
way system, has significantly influenced planning decisions in the region. Underground
lines, it was decided, were to pass directly through the centers of built-up areas. High-
ways, on the other hand, were designed to bypass the suburban developments by being
situated in green belts which separate the railway lines. The total concept features a
series of alternating greenbek corridors and built-up strips radiating out from the city
center. The result is a mutually reinforcing transportation and urban settlement system.
See generally G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 61-62.
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Land banking in Stockholm began in 1904, when the City As-
sembly inaugurated a policy of buying large areas of farm and
forest land within a 9 mile radius of the city's center.42 By the
1930's, 32 square miles of rural land had been acquired, including
much of the city's surrounding territory.43 Stockholm's boundaries
were extended to encompass this land, which was planned as the
location for garden communities for low and moderate income fam-
ilies in anticipation of future urban growth. By the end of 1967,
Stockholm's land reserve was on the order of 142,500 acres, and
more than half of this land had been purchased since 1960.41
The program is administered by STRADA, Ltd., a city-owned
real estate company that operates much like a private concern, but
has the power of condemnation. When land is designated for ac-
quisition, private owners are required to sell at market value. Since
land prices tend to jump when a plan for redevelopment of an area
has been adopted, Parliament enacted legislation which permitted
STRADA to acquire land needed for redevelopment before it had
adopted specific plans for the land.45 This legislation has been
vital to the effort to keep land prices reasonable.48 Money to fi-
nance the acquisitions is borrowed on the open market. In most
cases the land acquired has been leased out for farming until needed
for development.47 Rents thus obtained have been used to pay in-
terest on the borrowed capital. As land within the municipal boun-
daries becomes available, it too is purchased, with the result that
Stockholm today owns 36 percent of the land within its municipal
boundaries and 83 percent of the property directly surrounding the
city.4
8
The city has retained nearly all the land purchased over the
years, preferring to lease it out under long-term contracts, rather
than to dispose of it entirely. Consequently, almost 70 percent of
the dwellings on the city's outskirts are built on leased land owned
by the city.40 Under legislation enacted in 1953, leasehold contracts,
42 U.S. NAT'L RESoURcEs COMM., URBAN PLANNNG AND LAND POLIcIEs 313-14
(1939), cited in D. SHOUP & R. MACK, ADVANcE LAND AcQUIsITIoN BY LocAL
GOVERNmENTS 106 (1968).
43Id.
4 4 G. MILGRAM, supra note 5, at 64.
45 See G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 58.
46 See HOLMGREN, ABOUT TOWN PLANNING IN SWEDEN 5 (1965), cited in G.
EDWARDS, LAND, PEOPLE, AND PoLicy 60 (1969).
47 See G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 58.
481d.
49 Id at 59.
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once of 60 to 100 years duration, were made valid for an "unlimited
time," subject to termination provisions and regular 10- or 20-year
rental adjustments."
From the city's point of view, substantial advantages inhere in
the leasing approach. As owner of the land, with a power to termi-
nate leasehold contracts, the government can readily adapt to dy-
namic changes in the city's land development patterns without hav-
ing to resort to appropriation. This is particularly advantageous
since appropriation procedures in Sweden are generally complex and
time consuming.51
As another advantage, the leasehold system permits the city to
benefit from inflationary profits that would otherwise accrue to pri-
vate land speculators. Appreciation in the value of land, it is rea-
soned, is generated by the actions of the community and govern-
ment in expending vast sums, in providing public services and in
promoting better land use. It is thus felt that individual landown-
ers should not receive the benefits of this "undeserved increase of
land value." 2
These inflationary profits may then be distributed back to the
community by adjusting the terms of the leases. Leases are subject
to periodic renegotiation, so that as land values increase, rents may
be raised for commercial or industrial uses while being kept at the
original amount for low and moderate rent housing, in effect subsi-
dizing these latter groups.5 3
B. The Netherlands
Municipal land policy in the Netherlands, dating back to the
Housing Act of 1901,54 has sought to guide the development of new
50 Id.
51 In Swedish appropriation litigation, title generally does not vest in the munici-
pality until the case has proceeded to final adjudication in the courts and the assessed
compensation has been deposited with the proper authorities. An exception called
"prior admittance" exists. This exception permits the city to take possession immedi-
ately upon initiation of the appropriation proceedings. The city is required to for-
mally guarantee that it will compensate the previous owner whatever fee is established
by the court, plus six percent interest. A serious drawback to this procedure is that
the city is bound to continue its claim for compulsory purchase; under normal proce-
dures it is possible to withdraw a compulsory purchase claim even after the case has
gone to the nation's highest court. Id. at 60-61.
52 WESTMAN, MEMORANDUM RELATING TO ZONE EXPROPRIATION ON LOWER
NORRMALM IN STOCKHOLM 3 (1967), cited in G. EDWARDS, LAND, PEOPLE, AND
POLICY 36 (1969). See also notes 157-62 infra & accompanying text.
S53G. MILGRAM, supra note 5, at 64.
54 See BOMMER, HOUSING AND PLANNING LEGISLATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
11 (1967).
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areas by anticipating the need for land and by reducing the increase
in land value that results from government development.5 5 To
achieve these objectives, nearly every municipality in the Nether-
lands has developed an active land banking program, administered
by an independent Grounds Department.56  The municipalities of
Amsterdam and The Hague, alone, own more than 11 thousand
acres together.57
The considerable success of the large Dutch municipalities in
shaping patterns of urban growth almost precisely as planned, can
be attributed largely to their sophisticated practices of disposing of
lands after purchaseY8  While the type of disposition varies among
cities, appropriate covenants or lease restrictions intricately specify
the details of development to be followed by private developers for
each individual parcel of land released. For example, Amsterdam
controls development through lease restrictions contained in long-
term leases, terminable at a fixed period, usually after 75 years. 9
In Rotterdam, on the other hand, after the requisite plans for de-
velopment of a particular area have been formulated, lots within the
municipality are sold outright with a restriction that the private
builder must use the property according to the detailed reconstruc-
tion plans incorporated in the deed.60 The leasehold, however, is
generally favored in the Netherlands because it affords the munici-
pality the opportunity to avoid later appropriation for public pur-
pose, and better facilitates the later redevelopment of built-up
areas.6 And, as in Sweden, the leasing system enables the munici-
pality, and ultimately the public, to profit from any appreciation in
land values by allowing for appropriate renegotiations of rent.
Several features of the Netherlands expropriation procedures
have markedly contributed to the success of its land banking pro-
gram. A Dutch municipality can legally take possession of con-
demned property within three months after initiating expropriation
proceedings and compensation is negotiated or litigated after pos-
session has been effected.62 The criteria used for establishing in-
55 Grundlach, Urban Land Policies: Netherlands, in U.N. SECRETARIAT, HOUSING,
BUILDING & PLANNING, BULL. No. 7, 101-02 (1953).
57 Id.
58 See Reps, supra note 7, at 54.
59 Grundlach, supra note 55, at 101-02.
60IdGoild.
62 Id.
6-2 G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 69.
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demnity are somewhat broader in scope than those used in the
United States. Because compensation is founded on the notion that
"personal financial status should not be altered," the individual
whose property is appropriated is awarded its current market value
and any "anticipatory value" due to advantageous physical location
with respect to existing development plans.' In the case of indus-
trial or commercial dislocation, the condemnation award includes
moving expenses, loss of income, good will, and the cost of higher
operating expenses (including property taxes) at the relocation
site. 4 As a result of the relatively generous compensation settle-
ments, very few appropriation cases are litigated.
C. Foreign Experience Elsewhere
The experiences of Sweden and the Netherlands have been
singled out as illustrative of the efficacious ways in which land bank-
ing can operate, but other foreign governments are also guiding
urban growth by the large-scale acquisition of land. In the case of
Denmark, for example, land acquisition policy is geared not only
towards shaping and timing development, but also towards control-
ling land speculation in order to perfect the urban land market.
Thus, the municipality of Copenhagen offers its own land at low
prices in competition with private land owners when private demand
seems excessive.65
In the United Kingdom, it is widely felt that the key to proper
redevelopment of towns is public acquisition of land, followed either
by transfer to private developers, under conditions ensuring that
they will themselves carry out development in accordance with the
plan for the area, or by direct development by the local authority. 6
Israel has established a national land acquisition fund to prepare
land for agricultural settlement and to develop land for housing
and industrial purposes. The fund leases its land for 49 years to
public or private bodies, with provision for extension and inheri-
tance. Rentals amounting to four percent of land value are required
to be paid annually - the value of land, however, is reassessed
every 7 years. 67
63 Id.
64Id. at 68-69.
65 SeeTJ RTO R Ico PLANNING BD., URBAN LAND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PUERTO RICO 70 (1968).
66 Id.
6 7 PUERTO Rico PLANNING BD., supra note 65, at 71.
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IV. UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ADVANCE
LAND AcQUISITION
Unlike European municipalities, local governments in the United
States lack a strong tradition of acquiring and reserving land as a
means of guiding and controlling urban growth. Two conspicuous
factors have hindered the development of comprehensive land poli-
ies in this country. First, governments have been reluctant to ac-
quire land for anything other than a narrow class of public purposes
because of the historically entrenched view that private initiative
should generally determine the uses to which land is put. Land not
needed immediately for a specific public purpose, it follows, should
remain in private hands."' Second, governments traditionally have
been unwilling to bear the cost of acquisition when other means,
principally the various exercises of the police power, have been
available for regulating land at minimal cost.69 In the face of di-
minishing urban land resources, however, the wisdom of such a
laissez-faire stance and the efficacy of traditional regulatory mea-
sures appears doubtful. Many local governments are turning to
other measures in order to exert some control over urban growth.
A. Advance Land Acquisition for Public Facilities
A number of local governments have begun to acquire land for
future public facilities in advance of actual need by utilizing the
power of eminent domain in conjunction with official maps or mas-
ter plans.70 The advance land acquisition program in Richmond,
Virginia provides a good example." In 1946, Richmond took its
initial step towards a policy of advance land acquisition with the
adoption of its first master plan. The plan was based on a 20-year
growth projection and it set forth the location of future capital im-
provement projects. Three years later, a city ordinance was enacted
6 8 Aside from these political or social predilections, government officials may also
have felt legally restrained from attempting to implement comprehensive policies. See
notes 227-40 infra & accompanying text.
69 The degree of regulation by the police power is occasionally so great that the
owner, in a practical sense, has ownership taken away from him. In such instances,
the courts will generally find a taking for which compensation should have been paid.
Under the present system, the government is given no opportunity to pay this compen-
sation because the court declares the regulation invalid and permits the landowner to
violate it and use the land the way in which he desires. This method of invalidating
an ordinance can well thwart the entire purpose of the comprehensive plans for an
area. See F. BosSELMAN, supra note 22, at 27-39.
70 See generally D. SHOUP & R. MAcK, supra note 40.
71 Id. at 85-97.
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enabling the municipality to acquire any property on which private
construction was contemplated if the property in question was desig-
nated on the master plan for some future public use.72 By antici-
pating the need for land and purchasing it ihi advance, the city has
been able to forestall rising prices caused by inflation73 and prevent
construction which would have conflicted with the optimal selection
of sites for municipal purposes. Of a sample of 21 sites which Rich-
mond has acquired in advance for expressways, street widenings
and school additions, the average saving after all costs were taken
into account was estimated to be between four and six times the
cost of each site.74 In addition to the dollar savings there were
other intangible benefits, such as avoiding future relocation prob-
lems and strengthening the process of rational, long-term plan-
ning.75
Similar programs are no longer uncommon. The leading study
of advance land acquisition indicates that about one-third of the
cities of over 50,000 inhabitants in the United States carry on some
sort of advance acquisition activity. 6 The programs in existence,
however, tend to be small - typically less than six acquisitions per
year. Their scope is also narrowly confined to acquisitions for such
purposes as schools and parks.77
Montgomery County, Maryland utilizes a more sophisticated ap-
proach to advance land acquisition in that the county can acquire
land adjacent to proposed public facilities at the time the land for
the facility itself is acquired. The county is authorized to make the
necessary improvements and dispose of the land for private devel-
opment in a manner consistent with the nature of the public facil-
ity.7" Exercising such control over the adjoining land, the county
can avoid haphazard and suboptimal private development of these
parcels.
72 Building permits are required for all private improvements exceeding $1000 in
value. This application process enables the planning commission to ascertain whether
the proposed improvement is located on a site reserved on the master plan for a future
public facility and to determine whether the property should be acquired to preempt
the private development. Id. at 86.
73 The median rate of appreciation from purchase date to 1966 for a sample of 21
properties was about six percent per year. Id. at 90. This is actually considerably
lower than land inflation in most urban areas.
74 Id. at 92-93.
75 Id. at 95-97.
76 Id. at 4.
77 !d.
7 8
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE §§ 26A-1 to -4 (Maryland 1965).
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While ensuring the availability of optimal sites for future pub-
lic uses at current, rather than future prices, existing land acquisi-
tion programs have had little influence on promoting orderly land
development. Limited in purpose, advance land acquisition has not
been structured to control the pace at which the demand for gov-
ernment services will increase. Moreover, as the programs are re-
stricted to land lying within the municipal limits, they cannot guide
or control development on the fringe areas of the city where the
greatest growth is likely to occur.
B. Industrial Land Reserves
Another approach to planning for urban growth, the creation of
industrial reserves, concentrates more directly on some of the spe-
cific causes and effects of urban sprawl. In the past several years
industries looking for new sites on which to expand have increasing-
ly turned away from cities because of the prohibitive costs of acquir-
ing and developing urban land for industrial use, not to mention the
actual scarcity of such land. Confronted with the flight of busi-
nesses and workers to the suburbs and the concomitant weakening
of the municipal tax base, several cities have sought to stem the tide
by providing cheaper sites for private industry.
A good illustration of this approach is the industrial land re-
serve program being carried out in Philadelphia by the Philadelphia
Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), a nonprofit partner-
ship of the city of Philadelphia and the Greater Philadelphia Cham-
ber of Commerce.79 The program began in 1959 with about 2,500
acres of city-owned land, and today, with a 19 million dollar Indus-
trial Development Fund, a revolving source of capital has been pro-
vided by PIDC for the acquisition and development of 5,500 addi-
tional acres by 1980.80 The Fund has enabled the city to replenish
its industrial reserves and the overall program has ensured a con-
stant supply of new industrial sites at reasonable costs, thereby at-
tracting and holding industry.
A similar program has produced comparable benefits in Mil-
waukee, a city which began acquiring and reserving prime land for
industry in 1964.81 To date, nearly three-quarters of the plant space
79 See generally PHILADELPHIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TAKE
A LOOK AT AMEICA's FASTEST MOVING CITY... IN 1980 (1968); PHILADELPHIA
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PIDC's BIG YEAR IN NEW PLANT CON-
STRUCrTON (1967).
so ld.
81 See generally CONWAY RESEARCH, INC., MILWAUKEE: AN EcoNoMIc DEVELOP-
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in the industrial reserves is occupied by firms coming from the
suburbs.' Furthermore, while not yet having disposed of one-quar-
ter of the publicly acquired land, the city has already recouped over
one-half of the costs of the program.8 3
C. Land Banking in Puerto Rico
In 1961 the Puerto Rico Planning Board undertook a study to
investigate the supply and demand of land in Puerto Rico's urban
areas and to analyze the problems created by the rapid increase in
the price of public and private lands. 4  The findings and recom-
mendations of the study led to the creation in 1962 of the Puerto
Rico Land Administration, a public corporation empowered, inter
alia:
To acquire real property, urban or rural, which may be kept in re-
serve towards facilitating.., development of public work and so-
cial and economic welfare programs ... which may be undertaken
by the Administration itself, by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
or its agencies, and by private persons for the benefit of the above
mentioned public entities or of the community, including, but not
limited to, housing and industrial development programs . .. .
In enacting the ambitious and innovative legislation which
created the Land Administration,80 the Legislative Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was concerned with the nonoptimal
utilization of urban land, brought about by rapidly rising land prices
and speculation in real estate, and the disorganizing impact of these
factors on government programs. The 1961 study had estimated
that 16,200 acres87 of land were required for the next 15 years for
public and private residential purposes in the San Juan Metropolitan
Area (SJMA) - where most of the growth of the island was ex-
pected to take place - with 10,520 acres required for the first 10
years.8 The supply of land considered usable for residential pur-
MENT SURVEY (1970); MILWAUKEE DIVISION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ML-
WAUKEE LAND BANK PROGRAM (1965).
8 2 CONWAY RESEARCH, supra note 81, at 9.
8 3 See generally MILWAUKEE DIVISION, supra note 81.
84 See PUERTO RICO PLANNING BD., supra note 65, at 50.
8 5 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23 § 311f(s) (1964) (originally enacted as Puerto Rican
Land Administration Act of May 16, 1962, No. 13).
86 For a discussion of the treatment accorded the legislation by the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico and the United States Supreme Court, see notes 272-87 infra & accom-
panying text.
87 The figures in the study were based on cuerdas, one cuerda being equal to 0.97128
acre.
8 8 See PUERTO Rico PLANNING BD., supra note 65, at 50.
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poses was 19,100 acres 9 of which about 11,880 acres, slightly greater
than the 10-year demand, was immediately ready for use9 This
situation left a precarious balance between supply and demand,
which made it evident that meticulous care had to be exercised in
land use decisions.
The study further revealed that speculative practices in the pur-
chase and sale of land, together with the high pressure for develop-
ment in Puerto Rico, had generated a rapid and accelerating in-
crease in land prices, averaging 20 to 30 percent per year9' over a
5-year period. As a result, land in the core areas was being frag-
mented, making it impossible to assemble sufficient parcels for man-
ageable development.92 Consequently, there was a marked ten-
dency during that 5-year period for development in the SJMA to
move outward, bypassing the land that was best suited (except for
its inflated price) for development. 3
The land which was bypassed was creating serious social, admin-
istrative, and economic problems 4 Were such a trend to continue,
89 While all of this land will eventually be available for construction, it is not
necessarily the best land from the standpoint of achieving a relatively high population
density. Some of the land is rolling and hilly, and thus will probably be best used for
higher priced houses with minimum densities. Some of the land is subject to flooding,
and the construction around such land must be done carefully so that flooding damages
will not be intensified. Id. at 31.
90The Puerto Rico Urban Renewal and Housing Administration owned about
1,063 acred of prime land. The remainder was in private hands. Id. at 32.
911d. at iv. Inflationary trends in the price of raw land are by no means unique
to Puerto Rico. See note 180 infra.
921d. at iv.
93Id. The SJMA has increased in area by seven times in the past 30 years. This
growth has occurred, and will continue to occur, largely along the Northern Corridor
to the East and West, since growth is restricted by steep hills to the South, and the
ocean to the North. PuERTo Rico PLANNING BD., TUSCA PROJECT (Transporta-
tion and Urban Settlements Combined Action), INTERIM REPORT ONE 34-35 (1970).
94 See Commonwealth v. Rosso, ___ P.R. ._ (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
14 (1968) (per curiam), as translated in Callies, Commonwealth of Puerti Rico v.
Rosso: Land Banking and the Expanded Concept of Public Use, 2 PRosPEcrus 199
(1968).
Among the statistics cited by that court were the following:
(1) The rate of building construction went up from approximately 2,000
units/year in the decade 1950-1960 to 7,600 units/year in 1966. In the same
1950-1960 decade some 38,000 private dwellings were constructed in the
metropolitan area of San Juan. (2) In the past decade the metropolitan area
of San Juan absorbed the entire population increase sustained by Puerto
Rico. From a population of 509,000 in 1950 it increased to 648,000 in
1960, despite substantial emigration. It has been anticipated that the popula-
tion will be 863,000 in 1970 and 1,112,000 in 1980. (3) The number of
jobs in the metropolitan area has increased from 140,000 in 1950 to 180,000
in 1960, and it is anticipated that there will be 254,000 jobs in 1970 and
326,000 jobs in 1980. Of this increment it is expected that 65% will be in
industrial manufacturing and 33% in government. It appears that this will
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the area could never have been developed into a well-balanced com-
munity. The population would become too scattered for the gov-
ernment to provide it with adequate schools and other public ser-
vices except at great per capita costs. It was estimated that a 15
percent annual increase in land prices would increase the 15-year
cost of the housing program by $38 million and the road program
by $20 million. 5  This rapid increase in housing costs would pre-
clude a large number of families from purchasing housing on the
private market; in fact, it was estimated that a 30 percent increase
in land prices would result in placing an additional 33,000 families
at the mercy of government programs by 1975." The additional
land acquired to house these families and the increased land prices
would raise the cost of the program by about $200 million, exclusive
of the additional construction costs resulting from the larger popu-
lation requiring government assistance.9
The multifarious social and economic problems created by spiral-
ing prices and nonoptimum utilization of land in the rapidly devel-
oping areas of Puerto Rico were lucidly enumerated by the Legisla-
tive Assembly in the legislation creating the Land Administration.
The Assembly found:
(a) That the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is one of the
most densely populated areas in the world; that urban lands, or
lands adapted to urban development, are monopolized and kept un-
used by their owners, which creates an artificial shortage of land
and raises its price at a rate higher than the raise in price of other
properties and staple commodities; that the speedy raise in the price
of land makes it impossible for persons of moderate or low re-
sources to purchase land in appropriate areas, and forces such per-
sons to build their homes outside of close-to-town areas and far
from their places of work and other activities; that the raise in the
result in an increase of 80,000 in the number of families able to earn $3,000/
year in the decade 1960-70. It is therefore anticipated that the demand for
homes will increase spectacularly. By 1980 it is anticipated that 206,000 fam-
ilies will be able to earn $3,000/year, with most of these families young,
the men being in the 20-25 year age bracket. It is anticipated that from
20,800 of these families in 1960 there will be 42,000 by 1970 and 47,000
by 1980. (4) Although the present density has been six dwellings/cuerda it
is expected under the new guidelines established by the planning commission
that the density will increase to eight living units/cuerda. The 170,000
living units which are expected to be necessary by 1980 will require some
20,700 cuerdas. (5) To realize the objectives of public housing for 1970 fam-
ily residence, it will be necessary to construct about 16,000 units of public
housing and to develop some 12,000 plots of land. It will be necessary to
duplicate this number between 1970 and 1980. id. at 206 n.19.




price of land makes for undesirable urban expansions, which, in
turn, creates serious financial problems to the Commonwealth and
municipal governments, as the costs of providing public services
such as roads, water, sewers, public parks, public health, fire pre-
vention and fire fighting, police viligance, and others such as are
necessary for the protection of life and property, so essential for the
development of a community, increase several times; that the raise
in the price of land increases the overhead cost of industrial and
commercial enterprises and, therefore, sets their products at a dis-
advantage in commercial competition locally as well as abroad; that
the relatively speedy raise in the price of land increases differences
in income, inasmuch as unused land in Puerto Rico, both urban and
rural, is controlled, to a large extent, by a small number of persons;
(c) that the raise in the price of land also affects or prevents
the implementing of the master plans and is a cause of worry for
the public conglomerate and constitutes a serious problem, to con-
trol which available public funds may be put to maximum use, by
authorizing the acquisition of private property whenever necessary;
(d) that it is in the public interest to avoid, as soon as possi-
ble, the excessive and disproportionate increase in the market price
of land.98
It was believed by the legislature and expressly stated in the Act
that these serious increases in land prices were induced by specula-
tive land hoarders. Land speculators had acquired large blocks of
land in the metropolitan area well in advance of its present rapid
growth and, in many cases, held on to them until they could obtain
high prices. Inevitably, the reduction of the supply, relative to what
it would otherwise have been, created a further rise in the market
price of land. Because of the rapid acceleration of economic growth
and family income99 and the natural physical constraints preventing
the city from spreading in all directions, 10° these effects have been
particularly noticeable in the San Juan area.
Consequently, the legislature hoped to expand the current sup-
ply of land by taking measures which would tend to reduce hoarding
and to ensure that the long-run price of land could be stabilized or
increased at a rate consistent with the costs of holding land. This
would be accomplished primarily by providing a steady flow of resi-
dential land into the market, and, to this end, the Legislative As-
sembly granted broad and sweeping powers to the Land Administra-
tion.101
98 Puerto Rican Land Administration Act of May 16, 1962, No. 13, Statement of
Motives.
99 See note 94 supra.
100 See note 93 supra.
101 P.R. LAws ANN. it. 23, § 311f(j), (k), (q), (s), (b-1) (1964). Interestingly,
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The Land Administration is authorized to acquire any real or
personal property in any lawful manner. This includes general
purchase, purchase by option, installment or public auction, or acqui-
sition by lease, exchange, gift or eminent domain. 0 2  The private
property so acquired may be kept in reserve to facilitate public work
and social and economic welfare programs, including housing and
industrial development programs,10 3 recreational, beautification, and
open-space programs,' ° and irrigation and reclamation programs. 10 5
The only restriction imposed on maintaining its land reserve is that
whenever land is acquired by condemnation for purposes of public-
work development or social welfare, such purposes shall be carried
out within 15 years from the date of acquisition.106
In disposing of its property,0 7 the Administration is authorized
to establish any conditions and limitations regarding its use or utili-
zation as it may deem necessary to ensure the effectuation of the
purposes of the Act.0" It is further authorized to sell lands or in-
terests therein at prices it considers reasonable in order to lower the
cost of housing or to fulfill any of the other purposes of the Act.0 9
The Land Administration is further empowered to carry out by
itself, or jointly with agencies of the Commonwealth or of the
United States, or by means of covenants with private persons or
entities, any programs, including housing projects, to ensure the
most effective development and fullest utilization of lands owned
by the Administration, the Commonwealth, or its agencies."0  To
fund such programs, the Administration may issue its own bonds,
the legislation [Puerto Rican Land Administration Act of May 16, 1962, No. 13, State-
ment of Motives) frankly admits that traditional remedies have so far failed. It found:
(b) that this ever-increasing price of land cannot be controlled, nor the prob-
lems thereby created can be solved, by any of the tools available to the Com-
monwealth and municipal governments; that the levy of taxes and the regu-
lations of physical planning are insufficient; that the regulation on subdivision
and zoning operates prospectively for undeveloped and underdeveloped areas
and cannot prevent the undesirable, but legal, use of the land; and that the
regulation on land subdivision is insufficient to control either the expansion
of city limits or the disconnected and inadequate expansion of the cities. Id.
5 (b).
102 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311f(j) (1964).
103 Id. § 311f(g).
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secured by its revenue, income or property.' More importantly,
the legislature appropriated 20 million dollars for the Administra-
tion to carry out its purposes." 2
The Land Administration is constituted as a public corporation
a "government instrumentality having a juridical personality
separate and apart from the Commonwealth."" 3 Its powers are
exercised, and its general policy is determined, by a Governing Board
composed of the Governor of Puerto Rico, as Chairman, the Chair-
man of the Puerto Rico Planning Board, as Vice Chairman, the Sec-
retaries of the Treasury, Public Works, and Agriculture, the Di-
rector of the Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation, the
Economic Development Administrator, and two additional members
appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, each individual serving for a term of four years : 4
Because of the virtual identity of the Governing Board with the
major governmental departments and agencies - each of which is
extremely powerful in its own domain - the Land Administration
does not act with the autonomy otherwise indicated in its enacting
legislation. Consequently, although authorized to undertake devel-
opment projects on its own, the Administration has acted more like
a clearing house or general procurer of land for the other depart-
ments of government." 5
The land acquisition procedure used is for agencies desirous of
land to go to the Planning Board for a determination of whether
their proposed use for the designated land is in conformity with
the master plan. On approval of the Planning Board, the Land Ad-
ministration acquires the land, or any right, interest, or easement re-
quested therein, and reconveys it to the agency at a price it con-
siders reasonable." 6 Thus, instead of 10 or 12 agencies, each with
the power of eminent domain and each acquiring rather small quan-
tities of land for its individual purposes, the Land Administration
centralizes all acquisitions and makes large purchases, thereby re-
ducing the price per acre considerably." 7  Moreover, because the
ll Id. § 311f(m).
112-Puerto Rican Land Administration Act of May 16, 1963, No. 13, § 21.
123P.R. LAws ANN. tit 23 § 311b(a) (1964).
"14Id. § 311b(b).
115 Interview with Jack Noble, former legal consultant to the Puerto Rico Planning
Board, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Aug. 23, 1971.
116 1d.
117 Interview with Atilono Leon, Director of the Appraisal Division of the Land
Administration, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Aug. 23, 1971.
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price of property proximate to land designated for government de-
velopment invariably rises when the project is announced, the Land
Administration often condemns surrounding land to curb specula-
tion and to capture this unearned, publicly created increment in
value for the Commonwealth." 8  In so doing, the Land Adminis-
tration has managed to secure a steady flow of land at reasonable
prices.
As of June 30, 1970, the Administration had acquired almost
24,000 acres, 6,100 of which have been sold to government agencies
and instrumentalities for specific public uses."x9 The construction
of thousands of units of low and middle income housing has been
possible only because of the reduction in land cost inherent in the
economics of large-scale acquisition. 20 Moreover, the actualization
of two new communities, now in the planning stage, is likely to be
facilitated by the elimination of the legal problems usually associ-
ated with large-scale land assembly.' 2 '
Because of the immediate need to reduce inflationary land prices
and make land available for public purposes, the Land Administra-
tion has not treated urban sprawl and the promotion of regional
growth as priority concerns. Attention has recently turned in those
directions, however, with the recognition - reinforced by observa-
tion of the impact of a strict policy of acquisition without long-range
planning - that inflationary prices, leapfrog development, high
transportation costs, and expensive and inefficient public facilities
will continue unless a program to induce more compact develop-
ment (i.e., reduce or eliminate sprawl) can be implemented. Of
great significance for future development is the concomitant reali-
zation that past attempts to promote such development have failed,
in large part because they did not incorporate transportation policies
with land use policies.' The impact of intra-urban transportation,
118 Id. The price of property designated for condemnation will similarly rise. The
Act therefore provides that "just compensation" shall be based on the market value
of the property "without taking into consideration any increase in such value due to the
compensation project having been announced and publicized" and shall not include
"any new increase by reason of the public improvement or expenditures made in the
locality" by any agencies of the Commonwealth. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311m(f)
(1964).
119 Total cost of acquisitions has amounted to over $80 million, of which $15.5
million has been recouped from government agencies for land purchased at their re-
quest. ADMiNISTRACION DE TERRENOS DE PUERTO RICO, INFORME ANNuAL (1970).
120 Interview with Atilono Leon, supra note 117.
121 Id.
122 Interview with David Fairchild, Transportation Unit, Puerto Rico Planning
Board, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 26, 1971.
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combined with rising per capita income and a growing population,
cannot be underestimated.' In Puerto Rico, some 67,000 acres
were already in urban use in 1965. By 1985, assuming little or no
increase in average urban densities from those observed over the
last 10 years in typical urban fringe areas, it is estimated that some
330,000 acres will be needed for urban use. This implies that more
than one-third of the land available for development will be urban-
ized by the year 2,000.124 Such senseless sprawl, on an island with
already one of the highest population densities in the world, is the
result of unguided development and the lack of a public transpor-
tation policy.
The creation of the Transportation and Urban Settlements Com-
bined Action Project (TUSCA Project) marks the first step in incor-
porating this realization into government policy. TUSCA's objec-
tive is the development of an integrated program to achieve
mutually reinforcing systems of transportation and land use and
urban settlements.125  While the scope of this project is broad, the
recognition of the problem to be solved is, of course, the most sig-
nificant step in reaching a solution. The Land Administration's
powers to acquire both urban and rural land for a wide range of
public purposes will be the prime instrument to implement the pol-
icy of TUSCA.2 8
D. Recent Projects and Proposals
Critical for the implementation of any new comprehensive legis-
lative scheme in a democratic society is a broad recognition of the
problem sought to be remedied. In order to place a proposal for
land banking in perspective and to demonstrate that it represents
something more than the idle reveries of academics and planners,
this section will examine some of the recent legislation and promi-
nent public reports that have identified the "urban land problem"
and proposed land banking or closely related programs as solutions.
1. Urban Growth and New Community Development Act
of 1970
Probably the foremost recent statement of the need for orderly
and rational urban growth was that made by the Congress of the
123 See note 4 supra.
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United States in the Urban Growth and New Community Develop-
ment Act of 1970.127 Finding that continuation of established pat-
terns of urban development, together with anticipated population
increases, would result in inefficient and wasteful use of land re-
sources, Congress declared its intent "to provide for the develop-
ment of a national urban growth policy and to encourage the ra-
tional, orderly, efficient, and economic growth, development, and
redevelopment of our States, metropolitan areas, cities, counties,
towns, and communities in predominantly rural areas which demon-
strate a speciilr potential for accelerated growth .... 128
Should present growth trends continue, Congress observed that
irreplaceable natural and recreational resources would be destroyed,
public facilities and services would become increasingly costly and
inefficient, options as to where and under what conditions people
could live would be unduly limited, separation of people within
metropolitan areas by income and race would increase, business and
employment opportunities for central city residents would lessen,
and the ability of cities to retain a tax base adequate to support vital
services for their citizens would be diminished. 29 To counter these
trends, Congress provided for financial and other assistance to pri-
vate developers and state and local public bodies with the aim of
encouraging "the orderly development of well-planned, diversified,
and economically sound new communities including major additions
to existing communities."'13  Aid is available for several kinds of
development, including "new communities" which are: (1) eco-
nomically balanced within metropolitan areas as alternatives to ur-
ban sprawl; (2) additions to existing smaller towns and cities cap-
able of conversion to growth centers; (3) major new-towns-in-town
12 7 Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-609, tit. VII, 84 Star. 1791 (codified in scattered sections of 12 ,40, 42 U.S.C.).
12842 U.S.C. § 4501 (1970).
129Id. § 4511(b).
130Id. § 4511(f). The new Act of 1970 expands and clarifies the New Com-
munities Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3901-14 (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 1,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 513). The new Act creates the Community
Development Corporation (42 U.S.C. § 4 532(a) (1970)) which will act as the policy-
making body for new community financing, and allows local public bodies to finance
under the program (id. § 4516) as well as private developers (id. § 4515(a) ). Under the
Act direct loans up to $20 million are available for individual developers to make in-
terest payments on indebtedness incurred in financing new community development
(id. § 4515). Grants up to two-thirds of the planning costs are also available (id.
§ 4521(a)). Finally, the outstanding bonds, debentures, notes or other obligations
(guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. § 4514(c) ) shall not involve a principal obligation in an
amount exceeding 80 percent of land value and 90 percent of actual cost of land de-
velopment for private developers and up to 100 percent in each category for public de-
velopment agencies.
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to help renew central cities, including the development of areas
adjacent to central cities; or (4) free-standing new communities
which are economically feasible and would assist in distributing
population growth.' 31 A new community program is eligible for
federal assistance, but only if the new community, as determined by
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, would provide
an alternative to disorderly growth, 3 ' would be characterized by
well balanced and diversified land use patterns and would include
or be served by adequate public, community, and commercial facili-
ties. 33
The legislation thus recognizes that sprawling subdivisions and
suburbs ringing the central city neither provide adequately for com-
munity needs nor enhance the natural and urban environment. The
Act emphasizes the need to encourage orderly and balanced urban
development, and if wisely administered and properly funded, it
holds promise for promoting and facilitating the sound growth of
metropolitan areas.
2. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act
of 1968
The states, too, have begun to develop programs and entities to
promote urban development. Foremost among these is the New
York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC).13' The UDC
is a public benefit corporation whose legislative purpose is to deal,
more effectively than has thus far been possible, with statewide
131 See DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEW COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT, HUD, OUT-
LINE OF NEW COMMUNITIES ASSISTANCE (1971). While clearly focusing on the
problem of population and urban growth, the 1970 Act can have a salutary effect on
urban sprawl only to the extent that it does not offer new towns or new communities
as a single panaceic solution. Although widely heralded in a variety of journals, new
towns may have the untoward effect of exacerbating existing problems. Unless they
are truly self-sufficient, new towns may merely become satellite communities whose
vitality and viability depend upon the central city. If such is the case, all that will
have been created is a suburban development that contributes to the wasteful spread
of the metropolitan area. On the other hand, self-contained new towns geographically
removed from the urban center will do little to handle the anticipated growth of
urban areas. They are simply too expensive and too difficult to construct to be pro-
duced in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the expanding population. For a
different kind of criticism of "the new town approach." See W. WHYTE, supra note 20.
13242 U.S.C. § 4 513(a)(1) (1970).
.33Id. § 4513(a)(6). In addition a program is eligible only if it will be economi-
cally feasible [id. § 4513(a)(2)]; is consistent with comprehensive planning [id. §
4513(a)(4)] makes substantial provision for low and moderate income housing lid.
§ 4513(a)(7)) and fulfills other requirements enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 4513 (1970).
134The UDC was created by the New York State Urban Development Corpora-
tion Act of 1968. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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urban problems of physical deterioration, economic stagnation, un-
employment, shortage of housing, and the lack of civic facilities. 3"
Rather than being limited to any single area of need, such as hous-
ing or schools, its corporate purpose encompasses a broad range of
urban problems. It can plan and carry out projects to supply hous-
ing; to redevelop blighted areas; to assist industrial and commercial
development; to provide educational, cultural, and community facili-
ties; and, through a combination of these activities, to develop new
communities.'3 6
The corporation has been given the power to acquire real prop-
erty by purchase, lease, or condemnation.'3 7 Furthermore, the UDC
is empowered to develop projects without conforming to local zon-
ing ordinances or building regulations when compliance is not fea-
sible or practical.1 8 Unlike other development agencies, the UDC
has the power both to initiate and to carry out its own enterprises,
all of which can be accomplished through its ability to create sub-
sidiary corporations.3 9 It is authorized to issue notes and bonds in
the aggregate principal amount of up to one billion dollars, 4 ' and
its projects receive full or partial exemption from local real property
taxes.'
4 1
Apparently believing that the development of new towns and
rational expansion of existing communities is necessary to accommo-
date population increases in a balanced and efficient manner, UDC
has formulated plans for the acquisition of land and construction
of three new communities, containing housing, industry, and all
commercial, utility, and civic facilities required by a moderate-sized
town . 1' The new communities will be located in Amherst (outside
Buffalo), Lysander (12 miles from Syracuse), and on Welfare
Island in New York City. The proximity of these future com-
munities to major urban areas suggests that UDC, rather than at-
tempting to create entirely new self-contained towns, is focusing
upon ordering the growth of already built-up areas - an approach
135 Id. § 6252. For a discussion of the UDC, see Amdursky, A Public-Private
Partnership for Urban Progress, 46 J. URBAN LAW 199 (1969).
136N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6252 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
137Id. § 6255(7).
138 Id. § 6266(3).
'39 Id. § 6262.
140 id. §§ 6267(1), 6268.
141 Id. § 6272.
142 See Amdursky, supra note 135.
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which parallels that recommended by the National Commission on
Urban Problems.
3. The National Commission on Urban Problems
After examining the many current techniques for land use con-
trol, the Commission concluded that many land use objectives can-
not be achieved by complete reliance on those techniques associated
with the police power: "[A]ll too often attempts to apply the
police powers approach have resulted in failure to achieve public
objectives, and have been accompanied by substantial inequities and
abuses of power." 143  The time has come, the Commission con-
cluded, "for government to assert its legitimate concern with urban
development through the use of techniques necessary to accomplish
public objectives. In many situations, this [would require] that the
government actually obtain land through purchase or eminent do-
main - and that regulation be supplemented by compensation to
private property owners."' 44  The Commission recommended that
state governments enact legislation enabling both state and local de-
velopment authorities to acquire land in advance of development to
ensure the continuing availability of the sites needed for develop-
ment, to control the timing, location, type, and scale of develop-
ment, to prevent urban sprawl, and to reserve to the public any
gains in land values resulting from the action of government in
promoting and servicing development. 45 The Commission also
recommended that Congress establish a federal revolving fund to
facilitate the purchase of land by local governments.'46
4. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
A similar land banking scheme has also been proposed by the
Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations. In its report,
Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth, the Advisory
Committee suggested that the establishment of state land develop-
ment agencies - empowered to undertake large-scale urban and
new community land purchase, assembly, and improvement -
143 REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMMtN ON URBAN PROBLEMS: BUILDING THE AMER-
ICAN CITY 252-53 (1968).
144Td.
145Id.at 251. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DEcENT HOME
146 (1969), concerned with the availability of land for low and moderate income
housing, recommended that the Federal Government acquire large tracts of land for
the construction of subsidized housing and related community facilities.
34 6 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 143, at 252-53.
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would provide a major method of implementing state and local
growth policies. 47 Only by advance acquisition, the Committee con-
cluded, will it be possible for states and local governments to pur-
chase before development in an area takes place and before the re-
sulting rapid increase in price.'48 The Committee also recommended
that the Federal Government provide ready loans at low interest
rates for land acquisition. 49
5. Report of the American Institute of Architect's
National Policy Task Force
The most recent major proposal for massive public acquisition
of land is that made by the staid American Institute of Architects
in a national policy statement on the country's growth and develop-
ment.15° Citing the polarization of rich and poor, white and black,
the growth of the suburbs and the decline of the cities, the increase
of urban sprawl without community services, jobs separated from
housing, and the lack of choice for millions of Americans regarding
fundamental living conditions, the Institute proposed immediate
government purchase and preparation in advance of development of
one million acres of land for future community development within
the central cities and outlying metropolitan areas.' 5 The Institute
claimed that the acquisition cost, estimated at five billion dollars,
and a large portion of the costs of preparing the land for redevel-
opment, would be recaptured over the next 30 years by the apprecia-
tion in value of the land realized by lease and sale.'52 Running
throughout its recommendations is the conviction that land be
treated as a public, rather than a private commodity.
V. THE OBJECTIVES OF LAND BANKING
A. Orderly Development
As the population of the United States continues to grow, urban
centers will continue to expand into land which was once exclusively
147 ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND RURAL
AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 161 (1968).
148 Id. at 152.
149 Id.
150 REPORT OF THE NAT'L POLICY TASK FORCE OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
ARCHITECTS, AMERICA AT THE GROWING EDGE: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING A BET-
TER AMERICA (1971) [hereinafter cited as AIA REPORT]. See also Huxtable, $5 Bil-
lion Urban Reform Proposed by Architects, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1972, at 31, col. 7.
151 AIA REPORT, supra note 150, at 26-27.
152 d.
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rural.153  If urban development proceeds in the haphazard fashion
of the past, then the ills which characterize our present metropolitan
areas will likely be intensified. If, on the other hand, the timing
and direction of urban growth are controlled - pursuant to plans that
would, to a large extent, elevate to the public level the power to de-
termine the precise use for a particular parcel of land - new de-
velopment may proceed in harmony with urban needs and environ-
mental considerations. Regulating the sequence and tempo of met-
ropolitan development is a function for which land banking is
ideally suited and one for which traditional land use controls have
proven patently inadequate.
The importance of timing development cannot be overstated.
As was stressed above, urban sprawl is the cause of extraordinary
social and economic costs that could be sharply reduced if a pattern
of orderly and rational development were maintained.' 54 For ex-
ample, the cost of establishing and operating municipal services and
facilities in a newly developed urban area is directly affected by the
sequence in which the facilities and services are instituted. The
sequence of development determines whether facilities such as pipes
and streets will have to be extended inefficiently and uneconomically
over long distances to serve scattered users, or whether they will be
extended gradually to serve areas built in careful phase with ef-
ficient facility growth.
Timing of development is also important to retain control over
the eventual character of development. An area which is currently
remote from utility lines, for example, may, in the absence of con-
trol over timing, be subjected to scattered construction served by a
low-intensity infrastructure of individual wells and separate sewage
disposal fields. Subsequent attempts to convert such an area into
the denser character which occurs in the later stages of metropoli-
tan growth may be wasteful and expensive. Timing is similarly
essential to the economic stability of a rapidly developed area. In
municipalities where new residential construction of large numbers
of low and lower-middle income homes is not timed in relation to
15 Between 1920 and 1970, the urbanized areas forming the cores of the metro-
politan complexes of Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Detroit, Miami
and Washington increased their geographic area from under 2,000 square miles to
approximately 9,000 square miles. According to growth projections, these seven ur-
banized areas will double in the next 30 years to reach approximately 18,000 square
miles. Pickard, Is Dispersal the Answer to Urban Growth, 29 URBAN LAND 6, n.5
(Jan. 1970), citing J. PICKARD, DIMENSIONS OF METROPOLITANISM 89-91, apps.,
tables S-2 to -6, A-36 to -53 (1967).
154 See notes 15-25 supra & accompanying text.
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business and industrial expansion, it may not be possible to adequat-
ely offset service costs with tax income from commerce and in-
dustry.
By acquiring land on the periphery of the city in advance of an-
ticipated development, the land bank could observe market forces
and develop or dispose of land in an optimal manner. With the
flexibility and control derived from direct ownership of land, the
land bank could aid the implementation of publicly determined
metropolitan growth plans. For example, it could slow down de-
velopment by setting a high price on its land, or it could stimulate
rapid development by establishing a low price. Were such control
over growth the principal objective of the land bank, it would be
constantly selling and acquiring land: selling the most centrally lo-
cated sites in its reserve, and purchasing sites on the periphery. 5'
In this manner, it would be organizing the outward growth of the
city in an orderly way. And by controlling certain developmental
decisions, the land bank would ensure public determinations of
many questions of public import that have been left to the private
sector in the past.
Moreover, the land bank could reduce the costs of services to
the citizenry by acquiring land in advance of development at rela-
tively low prices. The increase in value upon the eventual resale
of this land would automatically accrue to the public, since the pub-
lic would own the land, and could be applied to meeting the costs
of any new services." 6 Conceptually, this is merely a reapplication
of Henry George's doctrine of "unearned increment."' 5 7 Land prices
are naturally enhanced when new public and private facilities and
services are established nearby, simply because such land is of greater
practical value; George believed it was unethical for individuals to
receive gains from land if the increase in value was not caused by
their own enterprise, but rather by the progress of society."" Con-
15 Of course, this pattern of urban growth is simplistic. Depending on the locale,
proper orderly expansion may not necessarily be outward, but may call for a complex
variety of development, redevelopment, extension, intension, and renewal.
156 See text immediately following note 215 infra.
15 7 See Hagman, The Single Tax and Land-Use Planning: Henry George Updated,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 762, 766 (1965); Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an
Instrument for Community Planning, 57 YALE L.J. 219, 231 (1947); Note, Site Value
Taxation: Economic Incentives and Land Use Planning, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115 (1971).
158 Georgian analysis was premised on the conviction that land was the most im-
portant of the basic factors of production. Since land was a gift of nature rather than
a product of labor, George believed it should not be subject to private ownership.
Given this proposition, rent gained through the mere occupation of land was an
"unearned increment," and as such, should be taxed. This concept did not actually
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sequently, he espoused a confiscatory tax on land rent which would
appropriate the unearned increase in the value of land for the com-
mon use.
59
George's "land value tax," lauded "not only as a panacea for
urban land use but also as a cure for unemployment, a preventative
for inflation and a guarantor of perpetual industrial and interna-
tional peace . . . ,"0 suffered a defect typical of many utopian
schemes.161 Even if tempered by being introduced into a municipal
tax system as a single phase in an integrated community plan, its
administration would likely be difficult. But a land bank could
achieve the same effect George sought without becoming entangled
in the complexities of taxation. By owning the land outright, a
public land bank would receive the unearned increment without
further ado.'
B. Urban Redevelopment
Public land acquisition and disposition is already a familiar com-
ponent of urban renewal. 3 By coordinating the activities of the
municipal planning board, the local public agency,'" various mu-
nicipal departments, and private developers, urban renewal is de-
signed to be a comprehensive program to redevelop and revitalize
our deteriorating cities. The urban renewal program, however, has
clearly failed to achieve its purposes. One factor that has severely
originate with George; its ingredients are often traced to the Physiocrats (French 1750-
1790), Ricardo and Mill. See Note, supra note 157, at 230-31. See generally E.
STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARiANS AND INDIA (1959); Hicks, Can Land be As-
sessed for Purposes of Site Value Taxation?, in THE ASSESSMENT OF LAND VALUE
12 (D. Holland ed. 1970).
119 Hagman, supra note 157, at 766-67.
16 0 D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF TnE PROPERTY TAx 197-98 (1968). As a land
use device, it was alleged that the tax would automatically prevent undesirable specu-
lative holding of land by keeping land prices low and thereby encouraging develop-
ment, while at the same time keeping prices high enough to encourage intensive uses
and prevent sprawl. Hagman, supra note 157, at 765.
161 Hagman, supra note 157, at 781.
102 Puerto Rico, Sweden, and the Netherlands have made this objective an inte-
gral part of their land reserve policy. See text accompanying notes 52-56, 118 supra.
Moreover, while not expressly articulated, capturing unearned increment is an implicit
assumption in United States municipal advance land acquisition programs.
George's concept of capturing "unearned increment" is still being extolled and
pursued by influential groups. The National Commission on Urban Problems has
emphasized that "land value results largely from social and governmental factors" and
recommends studies aimed at public capture of some of the values so created. BUILD-
ING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 143, at ch. 6.
163 See notes 299-307 infra & accompanying text.
164 See note 306 infra.
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hindered its efforts is the jurisdictional limitations of the municipal
agencies which implement the renewal activities. Edward Logue,
the Executive Director of the New York Urban Development Corpo-
ration, has stated the problem bluntly: "[A]s long as efforts to cope
with the poor are geographically confined to the central city, they
are bound to fail." '165
Urban renewal cannot properly be considered as affecting only a
community, a neighborhood or a locality - i.e., parts of much
larger wholes. The effects of slum clearance and urban redevelop-
ment reach far beyond the renewal areas themselves and touch the
entire region of which these areas are a part. Indeed, the economics
of the whole urban complex are involved in every renewal project.
Highway and street construction, water supply and sewerage, traffic
and parking, mass transit, and a host of other activities must all be
considered, along with urban renewal, as parts of a single metro-
politan picture. To achieve renewal goals, then, the entire metro-
politan area must be considered. While several states explicitly
authorize the cooperation of local renewal agencies, such coopera-
tion is of little utility when a large city is surrounded by many
smaller communities which do not carry on renewal activities" 6" and
whose indiscriminate zoning laws create incompatible uses along
municipal borders and prevent utilization of regional facilities.
A multijurisdictional land bank would be able to overcome these
obstacles and promote truly comprehensive redevelopment. Briefly,
the land bank would pursue this objective in the following way.
Parcels of land would be acquired and assembled into integrated
holdings of neighborhood size, notwithstanding municipal bound-
aries. Where needed, eminent domain would be used to obtain con-
tiguous parcels. Once such integrated holdings had been assembled,
the land bank, in conjunction with the local planning boards of the
municipalities involved, would arrange for development of the area
as a total unit, replete with police and fire protection, schools,
streets, and the like. Zoning, licensing, and building code restric-
tions, now an obstacle to meaningful redevelopment, 6 ' would be
revised to ensure harmonious architecture and to maximize the util-
ity of all the property within the bank's jurisdiction.
165 G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 114.
166 Sogg & Wertheimer, Legal and Governmental Issues, cited in URBAN RENEWAL:
THE REcoRD AND THE CONTROVERSY 133 (E. Wilson ed. 1963).
167 For a discussion of zoning as an impediment to integrated community develop-
ment in the urban renewal process, see Slayton, State and Local Incentives and Tech-
niques for Urban Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 793, 807-09 (1960).
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Land banking should be able to further improve the urban re-
newal program by providing a much needed timing and overview
component to the redevelopment process. The requirement of pro-
gramming the completion of renewal projects within five to eight
years of the final planning often results in "hurried, wasteful, in-
efficient, piecemeal, and often extravagant development, inimical to
the city's future."'"" To ensure development of cleared inner-city
land to its fullest potential, delay should be encouraged when it is
not feasible to immediately and efficiently develop the land. As the
former Director of the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority, Lawrence Cox, has stated:
Delays and land lying idle are inevitable if urban renewal is going
to do what it should in downtown areas. Projects involving great
investments do not spring full-blown upon the scene in the average-
size American community. Delay counseled by realistic appraisal
of land potential is worthwhile delay. So, my thesis is to have
worthwhile delay introduced into urban renewal, particularly in
central city areas. 169
A land bank might take title during such a delay, clear the land
and hold it - leaving it either unused or used for interim purposes
which do not require construction, such as parks, recreation areas,
and parking lots - pending determination of the optimal future
use.'70 During the holding period, there would be opportunity for
reviewing new proposals by private developers, providing the neces-
sary infrastructure, and modifying plans to conform to changing con-
ditions.' 7 ' Simultaneously, banked land outside of the immediate
renewal area could be developed for low- and moderate-income
housing for those displaced by land clearance, correcting a primary
defect of past renewal efforts. 172
1'8 Brownfield, supra note 38, at 760 (1960).
169 Address to the American Society of Planning Officials, National Planning Con-
ference, held at Miami Beach, Fla., on May 22-26, 1960, cited in id. at 738 n.28.
170 The demolition of deteriorating structures in the Cox scheme would admittedly
decrease the local tax basis, for even those structures bad enough to be designated for
slum dearance contribute to local tax revenues. Id. at 761. However, as part of the
urban renewal program, the city may receive a federal contribution to indemnify it at
least to the extent of the land being removed from the tax roles. See 42 U.S.C. §
1460(e) (1970).
171 The proceeds upon disposition, after payment of the purchase price of the land
and carrying charges, would, according to Cox's scheme, be returned to the federal
and local governments on a two-thirds, one-third basis, corresponding to the federal
grant in aid formula. Brownfield, supra note 38, at 760.
172 See generally, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 143, at 80-83.
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C. New Community Development
The characteristics of land banking which would enable it to
effectively promote orderly urban development and facilitate inner-
city redevelopment indicate its possible utility as an instrument for
new community development. While new communities, or new
towns, are a comparatively recent development in the United States,
they are likely to become a common fixture on the American scene.'"
The few new towns that now exist have been strictly for-profit
private ventures undertaken on a grand scale. 4 Future new com-
munity development in the United States, however, is not likely to
come about exclusively through private enterprise. New town oper-
ations yield a lower return than conventional suburban investment,
they require substantially larger investments of capital,' 5 and pri-
vate development of new communities can be stymied by a number
of nonfinancial problems. In fact,
the planned communities now being built in the United States are
basically the result of a fortuitous combination of circumstances.
New communities are being carried out by developers who have
come upon a large expanse of land held by a single owner or who
have quickly assembled land in a covert fashion . . , or by large
national corporations that have accessible raw land in a metropol-
itan area.176
Now that the creation of new communities is a national priority,
a more active role for state or local government is natural. A pub-
lic land bank, with broad powers to acquire, improve, and dispose
of land, could effectively fulfill this role and could facilitate new
community development in a number of ways. The land bank's
power to condemn land - supplemented by statutory "quick-take"
procedures' 77 - could expedite the assembly of integrated holdings
of land and avoid the payment of exorbitant prices to holders of
"swing" property (i.e., land critical to the land bank's purposes).
As a governmental entity with a strong capital-raising capacity, 78
173 The Federal Government has made new town development attractive through
grants, loans, and guarantees authorized by the Urban Growth and New Community
Development Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4501 (Supp. 1972). See discussion notes
127-33 supra & 311-17 infra & accompanying text. See also New Communities:
Business on the Urban Frontier, SATURDAY RFhEwv, May 15, 1971 (Special issue).
174 THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING CoMMIsSION,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 48 (Working Paper No. 12, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS].
.75 Id. at 52.
176 Id.
177 See notes 2 14-15 infra & accompanying text.
178 See notes 295-343 infra & accompanying text.
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the land bank could make the large outlays necessary to acquire
tracts for new communities and would be in a position, largely be-
cause of its power of eminent domain, to institute appropriate im-
provements, infrastructure, and community services, overriding local
regulations where necessary. Indeed, it is essentially the lack of
these features which Congress identified in the Urban Growth and
New Community Development Act of 1970 as the reason for pri-
vate enterprise's failure to develop new communities. Congress
concluded that new community development had "been prevented
by difficulties in (1) obtaining adequate financing . . . ; (2) the
timely assembly of sufficiently large sites ... ; and (3) making
necessary arrangements, among all private and public organizations
involved, for providing site and related improvements. . in a time-
ly and coordinated manner."'17 9 Because a land bank could be rela-
tively free from these problems, it is well suited to performing the
initial phases of new community development, after which "pre-
pared packages" could be transferred to private developers who, at
that point, would be more able to take up the process of building
new communities. And finally, with its ability to time and control
the location of development and impose restrictions on the use of
property, the land bank could ensure that development conforms to
plans for long-range metropolitan and regional growth.
D. Controlling Land Price Inflation
Since the postwar period, increasing income and population have
maintained a high level of demand for urban land. This continued
demand, in conjunction with a limited supply of land available for
development, has caused a rapid, long-term increase in the price of
urban sites. 8 ° In part, this inflationary trend is caused by specula-
tors who do not intend to develop their property; instead, they hold
land until the market price rises enough to induce them to sell and
179 42 U.S.C. § 4511(e) (1970).
180 In a four year period between 1960 and 1964, for instance, land prices for
residential uses were reported to have increased about 15 percent annually in raw land
and about 16 percent annually in the price of finished lots. G. MILGRAM, supra note
5, at 55.
According to a study prepared by McGraw-Hill for the President's Committee on
Urban Housing, areas of rapid growth such as Staten Island, New York, or Mont-
gomery County, Maryland have experienced five-fold increases in the price of land
between 1950 and 1965. Builders from the Washington, D.C. vicinity have reported
that the prices they paid per acre of land increased from $3,400 in 1960 to $5,800 in
1964, a jump of over 70 percent in a four-year period. PRESIDNr's COMM. ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DEcENT HomiI 141 (1969).
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then they take their investment profit.'8" The upward pressure on
land prices is increased by these speculators because the land held
by them further depletes the supply of property that can be readily
put to productive uses.'82 Given this longstanding upward trend,
it is not surprising that a common argument for land banking is
that, by exerting some control over the land market, the bank could
have a salutary effect on inflation.
Although other, more direct methods of controlling land prices
could be more effective,1"s a land bank's influence over the land mar-
ket would allow it to pursue price control as an ancillary objective.
By disposing of land at prices below what would otherwise be the
going market price,' the land bank could probably inhibit further
inflation. Not only would the competing, cheaper land from the
land bank tend to keep prices at a lower level, but the mere threat
of such interference with the land market might undercut the in-
flationary effects of the speculator. Knowing that the land bank
might release low-priced land at some future date - which would
curtail the market value of a speculator's holdings - the attractive-
ness of urban land speculation would be greatly reduced, and the
number of such speculators would probably decline. With fewer
speculators buying and holding urban land, the supply of prime
land would increase, and a major cause of inflation would be par-
tially eliminated.
Thus, by selling relatively little land, the land bank might be
able to control inflation without sacrificing its other objectives. But
the land bank's power to affect prices would be limited by a number
181 For a discussion of the speculator's role in a theoretical or "perfect" land mar-
ket, see Elias & Gillies, Sope Observations on the Role of Speculators and Specula-
tion in Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 789 (1965).
182 Such speculation can be effected with little capital by acquiring options on the
land, rather than buying it outright. Largely because of such devices, approximately
one-seventh to one-fifth of the land in U.S. central cities is held out of productive use.
See Hagman, supra note 164, at 165.
183 If the principal objective were to halt inflation of land prices, a land bank
would be a rather costly means of achieving that goal. A land bank affects prices
only indirectly, by dealing in land to such an extent that the entire market is modified.
Price controls alone could be achieved more directly without actual ownership of the
land, simply by creating an administrative commission empowered to regulate prices
in the manner desired by the legislature.
184 Because of its relatively low holding costs (see note 292 infra) and the econ-
omies of scale created by acquiring large amounts of land, a land bank could sell at
prices somewhat below those possible for private speculators without incurring losses.
To sell at even lower prices, the land bank would have to absorb losses on the property
involved. Such losses would be justifiable if the overall effect on the price of land was
adequate in relation to the amount of loss. Indeed, since future acquisition costs
would be lowered, the bank might actually lose nothing over the long run.
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of factors. The first and most important would be the absolute
volume of land the bank could sell at below-market prices. If the
quantity of such land was insignificant in view of the demand, any
inhibitory price effects could be temporary and the speculator might
simply wait until the market rebounded. Moreover, as the bank
disposed of more and more land in an effort to control inflation, its
reduced reserves would become a less effective deterrent to future
speculation. If the speculators were tenacious, they again might be
able to "outwait" the bank.
It must also be remembered that the land bank represents a new
factor on the demand side of the market. In seeking new land to
add to its reserves, the bank would exert some upward pressure on
existing market values, 8 5 thus compounding any other inflationary
tendencies. As in Puerto Rico'8 6 and New York,18 7 however, the
land bank's upward displacement of land prices could be minimized
if the enabling legislation provided that the compensation value for
any land taken by condemnation would be calculated exclusive of
the bank's upward effect on prices.
And finally, there is a potential conflict between the land bank's
18
5The mere fact that a land bank procured certain sites would probably affect
the price of neighboring land, independent of the increased demand represented by
the land bank's transactions. If the land bank had announced its intention to begin
development of a new community in a given area, for example, the surrounding land
values would certainly rise.
18 Section 14(f) of the Puerto Rico Land Administration Act provides:
In case of condemnation of property for the purposes of this act, the just
compensation shall be based on the value in the market of such property,
without taking into consideration any increase in such value due to the con-
demnation project having been announced and publicized.
The valuation to be made shall not include any increase due to well-
founded and reasonable expectation that the property to be acquired by the
[Land] Administration or by the Commonwealth, or other property similar
thereto, or situated within the locality where the former is situated, may now
6r later be required for public use or social benefit, or be necessary for some
use to which it can be applied only by the Administration or the Common-
wealth or any agency or instrumentality thereof with power for the condem-
nation of private property.
In case of condemnation, the just compensation shall likewise not include
any new increase by reason of the public improvement or expenditures made
in the locality by the Administration or the Commonwealth or any agency
thereof, nor shall it include any increase by reason of any other work done by
or at the initiative thereof, to effectuate the purposes of this act, when the
increase be the result of plans or resolutions, officially adopted, for the ac-
quisition of land for public works or for the purposes of this act.
187 The New York State Urban Development Act provides: "No award of com-
pensation shall be increased by reason of any increase in the value of real property
caused by the actual or proposed acquisition, use or disposition by the [Urban Develop-
ment Corporation] of any other real property for corporate purposes." N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAws § 6263(6) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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principal objective of promoting orderly development and a sec-
ondary objective of controlling inflation. In pursuing the latter
policy, land must be released from the bank's reserve with less than
optimal consideration for the developmental consequences of re-
leasing the land into the market. As more and more land is sold,
the success of the land bank's planning function is unavoidably
threatened. It is impossible to predict the precise degree to which
price inflation can be controlled without undermining the land bank's
other objectives, for the problems inherent in attaining any of the
bank's objectives are products of innumerable factors particular to
any given place and time. One crucial variable, however, is cer-
tainly the amount of land involved. The large quantity of land
necessary to ensure the orderly development of an area and the
quantity that must be released into the market to inhibit inflation,
would have to be compatible with the quantities that the land bank
is financially and practically capable of acquiring if both objectives
are to be achieved.
VI. THE LAND BANK ENTITY
To accomplish its objectives, a public land bank must have the
financial capability 88 and legal power to purchase or condemn land
throughout a broad geographical area. It must also be in a position,
largely unconstrained by state and local politics, to make public
decisions concerning optimal land use. Given these prerequisites,
the only governmental entity on the municipal, metropolitan or
state level that could effectively operate a land bank in most juris-
dictions would appear to be the special purpose public corporation.
A. The Municipal Corporation
Legal, political, and fiscal considerations dictate the infeasibility
of a municipal land bank. Since urban growth typically occurs at
and beyond the fringes of a city,189 a land bank must be able to ac-
1 88 The financial capability of the land bank refers primarily to the ability to raise
large sums of money for capital outlays. Almost certainly, this means that money
raised through bond issuances must be available to the land bank. Indeed, since
World War II, about 50 percent of total state and local government capital outlays
have been financed by such indebtedness. Manvel, State and Local Government Fi-
nancing of Capital Outlays, 1946-65, in 2 STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITY
NEEDS AND FINANCING, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 59 (Joint Economic Comm. Print.
1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC FACILITY FINANCING]. See also notes 288-350
infra & accompanying text.
189 Between 1950 and 1960, population in the suburban fringe grew by 48.5 per-
cent. Population in the core cities grew by only 10.8 percent and nine of the ten
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quire and dispose of land lying outside municipal boundaries if it is
to exercise effective control over urban development. Given the
less than sanguine relationship existing between city and suburbs,
however, it would seem politically unwise, and legally vexatious' 90
for a city to attempt to overstep its natural bounds and exert domin-
ion over suburban lands.' Furthermore, in light of the precarious
financial straits of major cities, it would be fiscally imprudent, or
even impossible, for most municipalities to attempt land banking on
anything but a limited scale.
B. The Metropolitan Agency
As local government's inability to deal with regional problems
has become increasingly clear, it has often been urged that munici-
pal government be reorganized into metropolitan areas.9" With a
handful of exceptions,'193 however, municipalities have jealously
guarded their autonomy and have refused to give up significant
power to any form of metropolitan, county, or federated govern-
ment. Moreover, outside of a few localities there exist no metro-
politan agencies with sufficient authority to act upon metropolitan
problems. And because of its potential for controversy, land bank-
largest cities actually declined in population. Grant, Trends in Urban Government
and Administration, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 38,45 (1965).
190 The power of municipal corporations to purchase or condemn land outside
corporate limits, where allowed at all, has been confined by narrow judicial construc-
tion to acquisitions for a traditional class of public projects such as airports, bridges,
and utilities. See C. RHYNE, MUNIcIPAL LAW §§ 13-1, -8, -9 (1957). Conceivably
then, a suburb wishing to resist central city land banking could initiate litigation chal-
lenging the extraterritorial exercise of municipal power. See generally Note, Public
Land Ownership, 52 YALE L.J. 634 (1943).
191 A city could attempt to expand its jurisdiction by annexation. But because
consent by the residents of the area to be annexed is a very common prerequisite
to annexation, this approach would appear to be of little utility to most major cities.
Dixon, New Constitutional Forms for Metropolis: Reapportioned County Boards; Lo,-
cal Councils of Government, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 68 (1965); Woodroof,
Systems and Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58
GEO. L REV. 743, 746 (1970).
192 See, e.g., S. GREER, METRoPoLIcs (1963); V. JONES, METROPOLITAN
GOVERNMENT (1942). For a contrary view, see J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE
OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 425 (1961). See also Friesma, The Metropolis and the
Maze of Local Government, in URBAN POLITICS AND PROBLEMS 409 (H. MahIood &
E. Angus eds. 1969).
19 Municipal federation has enjoyed varied success, for example, in the areas of
Miami, Nashville, Indianapolis, Winnipeg, and Toronto. See, e.g., B. SOFEN, THE
MIAMI METROPOLITAN EXPERIMENT (1963); H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL SYS-
TEMS, A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF METRO TORONTO (1967); Grant, A Compari-
son of Predictions and Experiences with Nashville "Metro", 1 URBAN AFFAIRS Q.
35-54 (1965); Grant, supra note 189, at 49; Laneberry, Reforming Metropolitan Gov-
ernance: Requiem or Reality, 58 GEo. L. REV. 675 (1970).
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ing does not seem to be a likely candidate to pioneer as an effort of
metropolitan government.
C. The State Agency
While state concern for urban problems has finally begun to sur-
face in recent years, the question remains whether state agencies,
even if committed by statute to serve urban ends, offer any unique
qualifications for the operation of public land banks. In many
states, the state agency is constitutionally restricted to the extent that
it could be of little or no utility as a land bank. These restrictions
range from an absolute limit on the number of state agencies that
can be created,'19 4 to less absolute, but equally important restraints
on the agency's autonomy and financial capacity.
In terms of financing a land bank, the states would appear supe-
rior to any lower political subdivisions. Though not without their
own fiscal problems, the states generally have greater capability than
do their political subdivisions for securing the capital necessary to
finance large-scale projects. Like municipalities, however, virtually
every state has some constitutional limitation on the amount or kind
of bonds that it may secure with its full faith and credit" 5 These
limitations - by cutting off the bond market as a principal source
of capital - would preclude the state agency as a viable entity for
land banking, were it not for the common use of revenue bonds. 96
In the majority of states, revenue (or nonguaranteed) bonds can
be used to generate capital outside of the normal constitutional re-
strictions on state debt.' 97  In only a minority of states - albeit
194 See, e.g., N.Y. CoNST. art. 5, § 2.
195 For a summary of the constitutional limitations applicable to the states' long-
term general obligation debt (i.e., that debt unconditionally secured by the full faith
and credit of the state government), see J. Dawson, Patterns of Obligation Bonds, in
PUBLIC FACILITY FINANCING, supra note 188, at 148, 153-55. Most state consti-
tutions either prohibit the issuance of general obligation bonds without public ap-
proval in a referendum or proscribe entirely borrowing beyond a certain level - a level
already reached in most states. Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
553, 557 (1957).
196 The current importance of revenue bonds, as compared to general obligation
bonds, is evidenced by the increasing percentage of state debt represented by the
former. See Curley, Patterns of Revenue Bond Financing, in PUBLIC FACILITY
FINANCING, supra note 188, at 156, 157.
197 Revenue bonds are debts payable solely from designated sources - e.g., from
earnings of revenue-producing activities (toll highways and bridges, electric power pro-
jects, etc.), or from specific nonproperty taxes. Such bonds do not constitute an obli-
gation against any other resources of the political unit if the pledged sources prove in-
sufficient. Through the courts it has been rationalized (principally via the special fund
doctrine) that this method of borrowing is not really borrowing at all within the
meaning of constitutional restrictions, since a pledge of revenues of a particular en-
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some of the most important urban ones - is the state agency inade-
quate from a capital-raising point of view. 198
Even in those states where revenue bonds are an approved sys-
tem of financing, the traditional agency is still not the best choice of
entity. While the state agency dearly has a number of positive
features - including the ability to allocate resources throughout a
large region and the power to relate metropolitan planning to plan-
ning for those areas of the state which do not yet contain urban
concentrations but which are obviously vital to the economic welfare
of the whole state - these very features, in conjunction with the
fiscal practicalities of the agency, also give rise to a major draw-
back. So as not to arouse the wrath of local legislators, a state land
banking operation dependent upon yearly legislative appropriations
would probably proceed too cautiously to be fully effective.'
A land banking agency would also be seriously hindered in those
states where its directors would serve at the pleasure of the gover-
nor. 00 Again, the traditional appointment and removal system ap-
plicable to the directors of the various departments of state govern-
ments would make a state agency more politically sensitive and less
autonomous than is desirable. Moreover, since coordinated, long-
term planning is critical to the operation of a land bank, the likeli-
terprise, as opposed to a pledge of the full credit of the political unit, does not create a
charge or lien upon the general revenues or taxing power of the political unit, and
thus provides immunity for the taxpayer. See cases cited in Shestack, supra note 195,
at 558-62. See generally Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprise, 35 MIcH.
L. REV. 1 (1936); Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L REV. 395 (1942);
Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional Debt
Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 177 (1937).
Under the special fund doctrine, cross pledging of net revenues of an existing pro-
ject of a special fund for the payment of bonds issued to finance the acquisition of new
properties (whether distinct or merely improvements to or extensions of the old), also
does not involve the creation of debt within the meaning of constitutional debt limi-
tations. See Fordham, supra, at 396 n.8. See also Shestack, supra note 195, at 560.
Some states follow what is called the restricted special fund doctrine, under which
revenue bonds do not escape legal limitations if they are to be amortized by the cross-
pledging of revenues derived from the proceeds of other special funds, such as license
fees or cigarette taxes. Id. at 559. In addition, under the restricted theory, a pledge
of all the revenues of an existing project to pay for only a part (addition or replace-
ment) of that project creates debt within the meaning of constitutional limitations.
Williams & Nehemkis, supra, at 194.
19 8 See id. at 211.
199 To the extent that a land banking agency could be established with a continu-
ing appropriation, or with an independent financial power operated through an "ear-
marked" fund (i.e., allowing the land bank's revenues from bond sales, etc., to go directly
to a fund exclusively reserved for the purposes of the land bank, rather than first being
paid into the state's general fund and then requiring specific appropriation), a state
agency could achieve some of the political autonomy necessary to effective operation.
200 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 5, § 4; N.J. CONST. art 5, § 4, S 1.
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hood that an entirely new slate of directors would be installed with
a change in administration weighs heavily against the practicality of
an agency form of land bank. In sum, while the typical state
agency has the necessary jurisdictional scope, it is often too con-
strained by constitutional or practical limitations to operate as a
fully effective land bank.
D. The Public Corporation
A frequent and successful approach to public problems with
interjurisdictional ramifications is to establish special purpose pub-
lic corporations, i.e., "corporate bodies authorized by legislative ac-
tion to function outside of the regular structure of state or local
government in order to finance, construct, and usually to operate
revenue-producing enterprises. ' O°  Ranging from the New York
Port Authority to the local sewer district, these special purpose au-
thorities are often created to provide for local or metropolitan needs
in the absence of a metropolitan agency. 2 Operating on a regional
201 Shestack, supra note 195, at 553. See generally J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT
GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1901); Abel, The Public Corporation in the
United States, in THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 355 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954); Alderfer,
Is Authority Financing the Answer?, in FINANCING METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
224 (Tax Institute 1955); Friesma, supra note 192; Gulick, How Do We Get Off
Dead Center, in METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 69, 74-79 (Report of the Pacific Con-
ference on Metropolitan Problems, S. Scott ed. 1960); Nehemkis, The Public Author-
ity: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14 (1937).
The public corporation is to be distinguished from the quasi-public corporation, the
latter being a legal hybrid which possesses some characteristics of a purely private cor-
poration and others of a purely governmental corporation. Quasi-public corporations
may be owned jointly by government and private interests, as in the case of the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) [47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1970)] or owned
privately and financed jointly with public and private funds. See Amdursky, supra
note 135, at 199. Because of the success of COMSAT, many proposals for public
action have suggested mixed private-public corporations. The advantage of such a cor-
poration is its ability to combine the resources and expertise of private enterprise and
government and to create a relatively risk-free market for private investment. See id.
at 204.
Because land banking operations have the potential to generate profits, there may
be a lure for private participation in the form of quasi-public corporations. Land
banking, however, involves decisions in which the maximization of profits may well
conflict with promoting the public welfare and with the general goals of the bank.
But the principal drawback to using a quasi-public corporation is essentially a philo-
sophical one. Implicit in land banking is the Jeffersonian notion that land is for the
common use of all men, and this concept is to be given effect through a public, rather
than a private, determination of how the land would be best used. The benefits pro-
duced should pass to the public. If private shareholders were the beneficiaries, the un-
derlying intention of land banking would be frustrated - not to mention the resistance
that would probably meet any effort to subject such large amounts of land to central-
ized private ownership.
202 The Census Bureau has reported the presence of 5,411 such special authorities in
the 212 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
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basis, they are more able to meet area-wide problems and to distrib-
ute public services equitably.203
While public corporations are instrumentalities of the state, they
differ from the typical state agency in that they have juridical and
corporate personalities separate and apart from the state. A public
corporation can sue and be sued in its own name 4 and can secure
its obligations by pledges of its own revenue and property, rather
than by the full faith and credit of the state.205 And the corpora-
tion's obligations, whether or not they are secured by designated
revenues, are widely approved as being outside the general consti-
tutional limitations on state and local debt.206 Moreover, all rev-
enues generated by the corporation go exclusively for its own cor-
porate purposes, instead of being diffused throughout other branches
of government as is generally the case with state agencies. 7
By operating on behalf of, but not necessarily within the state
government, the public corporation is relieved from many of the
usual governmental controls; it acts independently in such matters
as personnel, accounting, purchasing, financial management, and
legal services.20 8 Furthermore, because the public corporation has
no direct voting constituency and is relatively untied to partisan
politics by virtue of the overlapping terms of its directors, it en-
joys a degree of autonomy that is lacking in most state and local
agencies.209
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1971, 829 (1971). Some typical activities of these
authorities are bridge and tunnel control, park maintenance and development, oper-
ation of public utilities, sewage control, and transportation management. See author-
ides cited in note 201 supra.
203 See S. GREER, supra note 192; V. JONES, supra note 192.
204 Thus, the state will not be liable for any judgments against the corporation.
E.g., Linger v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 158 F. Supp. 900, 903 (W.D. Pa.
1958).
2 0 5 See Shestack, supra note 195, at 555.
206 See, e.g., Shestack, supra note 195, at 557.
2 07 See Abel, supra note 201, at 355.
208 Relief from civil service requirements and auditing may enhance more business-
like operations. See Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Com-
monly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 521, 587-88 n. 387 (1971).
2 09 See Abel, supra note 201, at 355-59; Gulick, supra note 201, at 76-77; J. ScoTt
& J. BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION 82-85 (1968); W. SAYER &
H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEw YORK CITY 324-37 (1960). Some critics of the
public authority approach would prefer to call this autonomy "anonymity" and decry
the absence of true public control over such corporations, pointing to such examples as
that of Fridely, Minnesota. In that city of 15,000 persons,, the citizens were expected
to exercise informed control over nine separate local governmental entities. COMM.
FOR ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNmENT 12 (1966).
Some critics also bemoan the lack of coordination between service-rendering authorities,
and point to metropolitan government as the solution. Such criticism, however, seems
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The public corporation's freedom from legal debt limitations,
coupled with the federal, 10 state, and local tax exemption on the
interest of its bonds2 ' and its immunity from local property tax
and local control,2"' gives the public corporation a substantial capac-
ity to undertake and finance large-scale projects. All of these fea-
tures, some of which are unique, make the public corporation the
logical instrumentality for operating a land bank.
When created,213 the public corporation land bank must be
to confuse cause and effect. The proliferation of special authorities, rather than caus-
ing the aforementioned problems, is actually only a manifestation of the deeper prob-
lem of management in a complex society. As the task of governing becomes more
complex, delegation of more and more power is necessitated. Thus, even on the munic-
ipal level we witness a proliferation of agencies and departments over which the mayor
or city council exercises little effective control. The best the mayor can do is to select
priorities, give general direction to city government, and appoint skilled managers
who will keep the city running.
Thus, the problems of democratic control and coordination may be lessened, but
will not be eliminated by metropolitan government. In any event, in the absence of
metropolitan government, the special or multi-purpose corporation remains the best
approach to area-wide problems. See Friesma, supra note 192, at 421-25.
210 INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 103 provides that gross income does not include
interest on the obligations of a political subdivision. A "political subdivision" is de-
fined in the Federal Income Tax Regulations as "any division of the State... to which
has been delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign powers of the State .... "
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1956). A public corporation which is designated in the author-
izing legislation as a corporate governmental agency of the state and which possesses
the power of eminent domain, should easily fit within the definition of "political sub-
division." See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1944) (interest on obligations of New York Port Authority
is tax exempt).
Also, a land bank should not be troubled by the 1969 amendment to section 103
excluding "industrial development bonds" from the income exemption. The thrust of the
recent amendments is to prohibit private business from reaping the benefits of interest
exemptions on state and local bonds issued to finance the construction of factories
to be leased to private industry. Although land acquired by the land bank will also,
in many cases, be transferred to private interests, the purpose of the acquisition-dis-
position, as in urban renewal, differs substantially from that involved in industrial
development projects. Unlike the nonexempted industrial development projects, the
land bank will generally not be constructing facilities to be leased. Rather, its role will
be limited to providing the land and infrastructure necessary for construction. Such
activity parallels the construction of industrial parks - projects for which bond in-
terest is specifically exempt under section 103(c)(5).
211 See Quirk & Wein, supra note 208, at 587-88.
2 12 See authorities cited in note 201 supra.
213 Public corporations can be validly created by special acts of state legislatures
despite common state constitutional prohibitions against the passage of legislation which
by its effect is of local rather than state-wide applicability. See Abel, supra note 201,
at 358. Cf. Meadowlands Regional Development Agency v. New Jersey, 112 N.J.
Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (1970). Although the geographical jurisdiction of a public
corporation may be limited, the authorizing legislation would probably not be deemed
a prohibited special or local act provided there is a reasonable basis for the legislative
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granted the power to acquire land, both through negotiated pur-
chase on the open market and by eminent domain procedures. To
avoid time-consuming prior purchase negotiations (which are re-
quired by many states before condemnation can occur) and pro-
tracted compensation litigation, the enactment of a quick-take stat-
ute might be desirable to facilitate rapid land assembly.214 There
are two key elements to quick-take statutes. First, title may be ac-
quired merely by filing a map and description of the area. And
second, litigation to set compensation occurs only after the taking. 15
Since the real payoff with land banking comes not from the
acquisition of land, but rather from its reservation and ultimate dis-
position for use, the legislation authorizing the land bank must pro-
vide for sufficient flexibility in its post-acquisition stages. There-
fore, in addition to being empowered to hold its land in reserve for
indefinite periods of time, the land bank must be authorized to:
(1)' carry out detailed site planning; (2) install, or contract for,
infrastructure improvements such as trunk sewers, water mains,
open spaces, and principal roads; and (3) sell, lease, or otherwise
dispose of improved sites or raw land or rights thereto to private
developers with appropriate use, development, and design restric-
tions.
The financing component of the land bank's enabling legisla-
tion should grant the power to borrow money and issue bonds for
its corporate purposes and to secure its indebtedness by pledging its
own revenues or by encumbering its property. The land bank must
also be authorized to enter into agreements with state and federal
classification. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d
791 (1954); Meadowlands Regional Development Agency v. New Jersey, supra.
Public corporations can also be created pursuant to state enabling legislation. Such
legislation would empower municipalities in a metropolitan area to jointly establish
a public body for the purpose of operating a land bank. To ensure a truly regional
or metropolitan operational scope, the legislation might prohibit operations until the
land bank district included a sufficient number of municipalities and townships to cover
a prescribed geographical growth area.
214 Note the quick-take provision for the Port of New York Authority. N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAws § 6901 (McKinney 1971).
The constitutions of many states, often referred to as "first pay" states, require that
compensation be paid prior to or contemporaneously with the taking. "The United
States Constitution requires no such restriction. Hence so far as the federal govern-
ment is concerned, a condemnor may take possession in advance of payment." Mar-
quis, Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Condemn, 43 IowA L. REv. 170, 172
(1958), citing Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). See also Bragg v. Weaver,
251 U.S. 57, 62 (1919).
215 A third element in some statutes is the requirement that the condemning public
corporation contemporaneously deposit with the clerk of courts the amount of money
it estimates to be just compensation for the property taken. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 13:17-
34(d)(3) (Supp. 1971).
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governments so as to be able to accept their assistance, financial and
otherwise.
Development projects approved or initiated by the land bank
must be coordinated with local and regional planning programs
and development agencies. Legislation merely providing for the
cooperation of planning and action agencies, however, is generally
insufficient to ensure their cooperation. Recognizing this, various
federal programs have successfully used the "carrot" of financial as-
sistance to exact a regional approach to this or that community
problem.21 In the same vein, since Congress has already declared
that orderly urban growth and development is in the national in-
terest,217 it is not unreasonable that it would financially embrace a
strategy calculated to encourage rational changes in land use pol-
icies, as land banking purports to do.
One way in which legislation could ensure at least a degree of
state and local cooperation with a multijurisdictional land bank is
to provide for the selection of directors from all pertinent levels of
government. On the state level, the following officials or their
equivalents could be appointed ex officio directors: (1) the commis-
sioner of finance; (2) the commissioner of commerce; (3) the di-
rector of environmental affairs; and (4) the director of the office of
planning coordination within the executive department. Planning
officials of the municipalities within the land bank district and per-
sons prominent in community affairs named by the mayors of the
respective municipalities would round out the board of directors.218
The executive director should be an experienced urbanist with the
necessary authority to hire a competent staff.
And finally, the land bank should be given the power to pre-
216 See, e.g., Vestal, Planning for Urban Areas: The Fight for Coherency, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 19, 42-50 (1970).
217 See notes 12 7-29 supra & accompanying text.
218 One approach to the question of control is illustrated by the Philadelphia Hous-
ing Development Corporation, a non-profit corporation created to serve as a city-wide,
centralized, property-acquisition service and land bank for acquiring, stockpiling, and
reselling to a non-profit housing corporation structures and lots that are suitable for
rehabilitation or new low-cost housing. The Corporation has 35 directors, 10 of whom
are city officials (including the mayor), the remaining 25 being other persons "promi-
nent" in community affairs. With a revolving fund provided by the city and with the
presence of city officials on the board, presumably the Corporation's activities are inte-
grated with municipal plans and policies. See H. BAIN, THE DEVELOPMENT DIs-
TRICT 141-42 (Study Prepared for the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission 1968).
The Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission has four of its seven
directors selected from the separate counties over which the commission has jurisdic-
ton. N.J.S.A. 13:17-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1971).
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erupt local land use controls which conflict with metropolitan and
regional needs." 9 The present structure of urban government has
proven itself incapable of coping with the enormous problems cre-
ated by metropolitan growth. Each local unit of government is
usually concerned only with the parochial, short-term interests of
its own area. Consequently, the wisdom of the states' delegation,
to local agencies, of the power to regulate and control land develop-
ment has come under serious attack. The National Commission on
Urban Problems stated the situation thusly:
Today, a basic problem results because of the delegation of the
zoning power from the States to local governments of any size.
This often results in a type of Balkanization which is intolerable
in large urban areas where local government boundaries rarely re-
flect the true economic and social watersheds. The present indis-
criminate distribution of zoning authority leads to incompatible
uses along municipal borders, duplication of public facilities, [andi
attempted exdusion of regional facilities.220
The states should not be content to allow zoning authority to be
unconditionally exercised by local governments, and should instead
foster a regional perspective in land use control. The states' respon-
sibilities for achieving rational land use could be met by giving a
multijurisdictional land bank certain zoning powers, or at least the
power to review local zoning. To be sure, such a power of review
2 1 9 At least two prominent public corporations have been empowered to overrule
local zoning regulation: the New York State Urban Development Corporation, if it
finds that a site is appropriate for low or moderate income housing, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAwS § 6283 (McKinney Supp. 1971); and the Hackensack Meadowlands Develop-
ment Commission, which encompasses 14 municipalities. N.J.S.A. 13:17-11(b) (Supp.
1971).
A number of state agencies have been given similar innovative land use powers
to combat various social problems on a regional level. For example, Massachusetts
deals with the problem of obtaining local permission to construct modestly priced hous-
ing in the Zoning Appeals Act, 40B MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971),
which establishes a Housing Appeals Committee within the Department of Commu-
nity Affairs to hear appeals by developers who have been denied the necessary local ap-
proval to build subsidized housing. The Committee's standard of review is whether
the local board acted in a matter "consistent with local needs," id. § 23, defined to in-
clude regional housing needs, traditional local standards for residential development,
and an equal treatment of subsidized and unsubsidized housing. Id. § 20.
Maine now requires all large commercial and industrial developments to obtain a
permit from the state's Environmental Improvement Commission. 38 ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. chs. 481-88 (Supp. 1970). And numerous coastal states have enacted wetland
legislation requiring a permit from a state agency prior to any development in marsh-
land areas. See, e.g., 130 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27A 1051 (Supp. 1970). See
generally Vestal, Government Fragmentation in Urban Areas, 43 U. COL. L. REv. 155,
161-69 (1971); THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE 1-4 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
2 20 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 19 (1969).
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would not completely replace local regulation as the mechanism for
controlling land use. Many, if not the majority of land use deci-
sions do not involve matters of metropolitan, regional, or state
concern, and these instances should be handled by local agencies
especially familiar with the conditions of the immediate community.
But those decisions which would have an impact beyond municipal
borders should be subject to review, and possible reversal, by the
public land bank to ensure conformity with a development and
growth plan for the region.
VII. THE LEGALITY OF USING CONDEMNATION FOR
LAND BANKING PURPOSES
In most cases, a public land bank should acquire property by
negotiated purchase. The ability to acquire land by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, however, would be critical to a land
bank's operation. Without the power to take property by condem-
nation, private owners could frustrate the bank's objectives either
by refusing outright to sell or by demanding unjustifiably high
prices. The mere threat of condemnation would tend to minimize
the number of such cases, 221 and the actual use of the eminent do-
main power would, of course, compel any remaining owners to trans-
fer their property for "just compensation. 2  Because the power
of eminent domain would occupy such an important place in the
operation of a land bank, it is appropriate here to consider the legal-
ity, under both federal and state law, of using condemnation for
the general purposes which land banking pursues.2z
A. The "Public Use" Requirement
Eminent domain has been defined as "the power, inherent in a
sovereign state, of taking or of authorizing the taking of any prop-
2 2 1 The fraction of acquisitions that would be consummated by purchase rather
than condemnation, would depend upon a number of factors. One of the most obvious,
however, is the extent to which the land bank would offer "full" compensation, espe-
cially in comparison with typical judicial awards. Cf. notes 62-64 supra & accompany-
ing text.
222 For a thorough treatment of just compensation, see L. ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953).
22a There is no need to make a similar inquiry regarding the power of a govern-
mental entity to purchase property for land banking. Once it is shown that the con-
demnation power could be so used, as this section shows, then the power to purchase
follows naturally because the latter is invariably as broad or broader in scope as the
former. See Note, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain,
77 HARV. L. REV. 717, 719 (1963). See also Marquis, Constitutional and Statutory
Authority to Condemn, 43 IOWA L. REV. 170 (1958).
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erty within its jurisdiction for the public good.'2 2 4  Once it is granted
that the government of a given territory is sovereign, it necessarily
follows that the government possesses the power to appropriate any
property within its jurisdiction for public use.225  Thus, provisions
found in state constitutions, as well as the Federal Constitution, re-
lating to the taking of property do not, even by implication, grant
the power of eminent domain; they merely limit a power already
existing which would otherwise be unlimited.226
The most important limitation on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain is the requirement that private property be taken
only for a public use. This limitation is imposed by explicit con-
stitutional prohibitions in only a few states, but all state courts have
agreed in holding that property may not be taken but for public
use.227  The Federal Constitution also imposes a public use require-
ment, both on the states and the Federal Government. The fifth
amendment, which contains the typical constitutional phrase, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compen-
sation," clearly binds only the Federal Government; but the Supreme
Court has held that the due process clause of the 14th amendment
similarly prohibits the states from taking property for private use. 28
224 1 P. NICHOLS, TIH LAW OF El%4N DOMAIN § 1 (2d ed. 1917) (emphasis
added). See also 1 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1 (3d ed. 1909); Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) ("It [the power of eminent domain] requires no
constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty").
225 p. NIcHOLs, supra note 224, at § 17.
2 2 6 Id. See also J. LEWIs, supra note 224, at §§ 3, 9, 10. Cf. Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
227 See, e.g., Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain,
20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940).
Different courts have evoked different reasons for this holding, some relying on a
negative inference from common constitutional provisions, "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." See id.; J. Lms, supra note
224, at § 250. Others have founded their opinion on the ground that it would be
contrary to general constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his
property except by the law of the land. J. LEwIs, supra note 224, at § 250. And a
few courts have held that to take property for private use would subvert the funda-
mental principles of free government, or the "spirit" of the state constitution. Id.
2 2 8 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). In applying the public
use restriction to individual cases, however, the Supreme Court has maintained a long
tradition of refusing to interfere with local exercises of the power of eminent domain.
In 1908, for example, the Court stated that "no case is recalled where this Court has
condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment a taking upheld by the state
'court as a taking for public use in conformity with its laws." Hairston v. Danville
& Western Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908). The same statement would apply with
equal force today: the Supreme Court has never reversed a state court determina-
tion that a condemnation was consonant with state public use requirements, nor has it
ever "invalidated a federal taking for lack of a public use so far as is known." Mar-
quis, supra note 223, at 189. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954); United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 598, 607 (1946). In recent years, the common
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Although the public use requirement is well-ensconced in the
law, its meaning is not so settled. State and federal courts alike
have generally avoided articulating broad guiding principles or gen-
eral definitions of the term.229 For the most part, they have pro-
ceeded to determine the meaning of "public use" on a case-by-case
basis, "influenced more by the settled practices and social necessities
of the people of the state in which the question arises than by philo-
logical considerations. '23 0  Consequently, what is a public use has
varied from state to state and from time to time, and whether the
taking of property to promote orderly urban growth and minimize
urban sprawl and deterioration constitutes a public use will depend
largely upon whether the courts concur with a legislative finding
that such activity is beneficial to the community.
Prior to the turn of the century, the power of eminent domain
was often limited by the requirement that condemned property be
put to a use falling within a narrow class of traditional governmen-
tal functions.23l Moreover, condemnation was prohibited unless the
property to be taken would be available for actual useas u by the
public at large.2 33  With the advent of the 20th century, however,
practice of the Court has been to deny certiorari to appeals challenging the constitu-
tionality of state takings. In some instances the Court has also dismissed appeals.
See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Rosso, --- P.R.R. (Opinion No. 67-172, El Tribuno
Supreme de Puerto Rico, December 7, 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 14 (1968);
Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958);
Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954); Carlor Co. v. Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953); Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. White, 411 Ill.
310, 104 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar
Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946).
2 2 9 J. LEWIS, supra note 224, at § 252; P. NICHOLS, supra note 224, at § 40.
What is a public use, although in the first instance a legislative question, is in the
last analysis a question for the courts. LEWIS, supra note 224, at § 251. Cf. United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
230 p. NICHOLS, supra note 224, at § 40.
231 These functions were such customary uses as public roads, public schools, gov-
ernment buildings, and drainage ditches. See T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS 1129 (8th ed. 1927); P. NICHOLS, supra note 224, at § 41.
232 This did not mean that the public must have a right to enter the specific prop-
erty; it might be used, for example, as a fort, or arsenal, or power house from which
the public was excluded. NICHOLS, supra note 227, at 618. See also P. NICHOLS, supra
note 224, at § 53.
233 In some cases, this marked a retreat from earlier court posture on the subject.
In several states the desire to encourage exploitation of natural resources and to increase
industrial development had led to the conferring of substantial benefits upon private com-
panies justified by a broad public use theory. For instance, a grant of eminent do-
main to a private gold mining company was justified by the relationship of gold to
the national currency. Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877). Private
individuals were also the recipients of government largesse. For example, a taking of
land for construction of a private road to be used only by the landowner on whose be-
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courts began to refashion the public use doctrine, making it more
responsive to the expanding scope of governmental activity.
Whether this change in view reflected judicial foresight or was
merely the result of the difficulties of applying a stringent test to
myriad factual situations is unclear.2 4  But in any event, the "use
by the public" test was slowly abandoned in favor of a more expan-
sive test better attuned to the social needs of an increasingly indus-
trialized society 35 Several courts, for example, while adhering to
the notion that the ultimate use of appropriated land must be bene-
ficial to more than just a few persons, began to equate public use
with public benefit.23 As the Supreme Court of Illinois held:
"[Plublic use means public usefulness, utility, advantage or bene-
fit."237  And the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, approving con-
demnation of land to improve Boston Harbor, stated that it was not
necessary that the entire community directly enjoy or participate in
an improvement or enterprise to find a public use. 8
The public use requirement did not become coextensive with pub-
lic benefit or advantage in all jurisdictions contemporaneously.
While a number of courts forthrightly insisted that the public bene-
fit test satisfied the public use requirement, 23 9 many others dung to
the narrower view even though they were forced "to sanction loop-
holes, limitations, and evasions of the doctrine to avoid bringing it
into irreconcilable conflict with the expanding industrialization of
the times." 4 °  The unworkability of the "use by the public" test,
however, was apparent to most,241 and by the late 1930's and 1940's
half it was constructed was approved as a public use on the theory that it provided a
means for him to leave his home to vote and sit on juries. Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga.
37, 40-41 (1850).
By the middle of the 19th century, reaction against legislative excesses impelled
the courts to seek a narrower definition of the eminent domain power. The result was
an increase in the protection of private property by the development of the theory that
indirect benefit to the community did not justify the exercise of eminent domain.
Instead, it was deemed necessary that the public possess a "right" to use the facility or
service for which the property was desired. See generally Nichols, supra note 227,
at 618-19; Note, supra note 223.
2 34 See Nichols, supra note 227, at 619.
2 3 5 See J. LEwis, supra note 224, at § 256.
26 See P. NICHOLS, supra note 224, at § 504 n.26-30.
237 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Polecat Drainage Dis-
trict, 213 Ill. 83, 85, 72 N.E. 684, 685 (1904).
238 Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 205,206,24 N.E. 323, 324 (1890).
23 9 See P. NiCHOLS, supra note 224, at § 504, n. 26-30; LEwiS, supra note 224,
at § 131, n.18; Nichols, supra note 227, at 619.
240 Nichols, supra note 227, at 619.
2 41 The Supreme Court expressly repudiated the narrow doctrine in 1916, declaring
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 897
condemnation and slum clearance for public housing were upheld
in nearly every state undertaking such programs, despite the fact
that the primary use was to be restricted to relatively few individ-
uals.242 The language of the New York Court of Appeals in the
1936 case of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller was in-
dicative of the trend:
The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the
health, safety and general welfare of the public. . . . Its power
plant for the purpose consists of the power of taxation, the police
power and the power of eminent domain .... [I]f the menace is
serious enough to the public to warrant public action and the power
applied is reasonable and fairly calculated to check it, and bears a
reasonable relation to the evil, it seems to be constitutionally im-
material whether one or another of the sovereign powers is em-
ployed.
Use of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and
anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use....
In a matter of farreaching public concern, the public is seeking
to take the defendant's property and to administer it as part of a
project conceived and to be carried out in its own interest and for
its own protection. That is a public benefit, and, therefore, at least
as far as this case is concerned, a public use.2 4a
The equation of public use with public benefit, as evidenced in
Muller,244 effected a radical change in eminent domain law. The
conceptual shift to public benefit allowed the courts to concentrate
on the overall purpose of the project for which land was to be
condemned, while minimizing the question of the specific use to
which the property would ultimately be put.2 45 Thus, if the overall
that it was inadequate as a universal standard. See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck
Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
2 4 2 See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955).
The objection uniquely and most frequently raised against the validity of re-
development acts is that, because of the turning over of lands acquired to pri-
vate interests for development, the purpose contemplated is not such "public
use" as justifies the power of eminent domain.... Almost without exception
the redevelopment acts have been upheld against this type of objection. Id.
at 1420.
See also Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB., 705, 711-15 (1960); McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing:
An Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 46 n.13 (1942).
24a 270 N.Y. 333, 340, 341,342, 343, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155, 156 (1936).
244 The Muller court had framed the issue in the following terms: "We are called
upon to say whether under the facts of this case, including the circumstances of time
and place, the use of the power [of eminent domain) is a use for the public benefit
a public use - within the law." Id. at 339-40, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
245 For example, note the language of Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v.
Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 790, 266 P.2d 105, 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897
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purposes of a project were beneficial to the community, and the use
of condemned property bore a reasonable relation to these purposes,
then the public use requirement was satisfied.24
Epitomizing this change in view is the 1954 Supreme Court de-
cision in Bet-man v. Parker,17 which upheld the constitutionality of
urban renewal under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act
of 1945.248 The Act authorized condemnation for the purpose of
"redevelopment of blighted territory ... and the prevention, reduc-
tion, or elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight."214
The plaintiffs owned nonresidential property, in sound condition,
which was to be taken for the purposes of a renewal project. They
argued that the taking of sound property in order to develop a better
balanced, more attractive community did not constitute a legitimate
public purpose. The Court rejected this argument, holding that it
was well within the government's power to condemn property as
part of an overall plan to make the community "beautiful as well
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled."25  Having found that the replanning and rede-
(1954): "[Ihe more modern courts have enlarged the traditional definition of public
use to include 'public purpose.' The idea now is that the taking of the property itself,
as distinguished from the subsequent use of that property, may be required in the public
interest." See also Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 141, 104 A.2d 365,
368-69 (1954):
In this state it is settled that public use means "public usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit, so that any appropriating
of private property by the State under its right of eminent domain for pur-
poses of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use. (cita-
tions omitted).
See also People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 Ill. 2d 74, 78,
150 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1958): "This court and other courts have repeatedly held that
the acquisition of a slum and blighted area and the removal of slum conditions is in it-
self a public purpose regardless of the use thereafter."
2 46In this context, consider Dorman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa.
209, 226, 200 A. 834, 842 (1938): "[When the power of eminent domain is ...
called into play as a handmaiden to the police power and in order to make a proper
exercise of the police power effective, it is necessarily [exercised for] a public use." See
also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (governmental action
will be upheld if it is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests
of the community).
27348 U.S. 26 (1954).
248 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1967) (originally enacted as Columbia Re-
development Act of 1945, 60 Star. 790).
249 Id. at § 5-704.
250 348 U.S. at 33. The lower court had stated:
In sum, the purpose of the plan, in addition to the elimination of slum
conditions, is to create a pleasant neighborhood, in which people in well-bal-
anced proportions as to income may live. The Government is to determine
what conditions are pleasant, what constitutes the "most appropriate" pattern
of land use, what is a good balance of income groups for a neighborhood, how
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velopment of slum areas constituted a valid public purpose, the
Court concluded that land, buildings, or improvements not in them-
selves unsanitary or substandard could be included in the condemna-
tion site if deemed an integral part of the effective clearance, re-
planning, and reconstruction of the slum area.
The same conclusion was reached in regard to plaintiffs' claim
that transferring condemned land to private interests for implemen-
tation of the renewal project amounted to a violation of the public
use requirement, as a taking of one businessman's land for the bene-
fit of another. As the Court stated:
[T]he means of executing the project are for Congress and Con-
gress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-
lished. The public end may be as well or better served through
an agency of private enterprise than through a department of gov-
ernment - or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that
public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public pur-
pose of community redevelopment projects.2 1
Berman, of course, dealt only with federal legislation pertain-
ing to the District of Columbia, but the Court explicitly stated
that the very same principles were applicable to 14th amendment
restrictions on state takings. "The legislature, not the judiciary, is
the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legis-
lation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District
of Columbia . . . or the states legislating concerning local affairs.1 252
many poor people, how many moderately well-to-do people, how many fam-
ilies of two, how many of four, etc., should be provided for in this neigh-
borhood, and what the proper development of a community should be.
Of course the plan as pictured in the prospectus is attractive.... But as
yet the courts have not come to call such pleasant accomplishments a public
purpose which validates government seizure of private property. Schneider
v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724 (D.D.C. 1953).
251 348 U.S. at 33-34. Even before Berman, the state courts had been relatively
unconcerned with the disposition of appropriated property once it had been established
that its taking was for a public purpose. See, e.g., cases cited in Redevelopment Agency
of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 787-88, 266 P.2d 105, 112, cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954). As one court had remarked: "If upon completion of the
project the public good is enhanced, it does not matter that private interests may be
benefited." Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 329-30, 52 N.E.2d 884, 888 (1943).
252 348 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted). The principle of judicial deference to legis-
lative determinations in the area of social legislation, the court stated, "admits of no
exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is
an extremely narrow one." Id. See also United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546, 552 (1946):
[W]hen Congress has spoken on the subject (of public use], "Its decision is
entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility." Old Do-
minion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66. Any departure from this ju-
dicial restraint would result in courts deciding what is and what is not a gov-
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Equally as important as Berman, however, were the many state deci-
sions which upheld government projects against claims that the pub-
lic use requirements of the state constitutions were violated. In
most of these cases, the state courts adopted broad principles similar
to those of Muller or Berman; the only differences lay in the factual
circumstances of these other cases, which in some senses "went be-
yond" the situations of Muller or Berman.
In People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago,"5 for example, the
Supreme Court of Illinois approved legislation authorizing -the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain for redevelopment of predom-
inantly open areas which were unmarketable for decent housing or
other acceptable uses and seemed destined to become slums them-
selves. Holding that the power of eminent domain could be used
not only to eliminate slums but to prevent them as well, the court
remarked: "We are aware of no constitutional premise which para-
lyzes the power of government to deal with an evil until it has
reached its maximum development. ' 2
In a similar case, a California district court of appeals upheld a
program to convert a blighted area, which was 85 percent vacant,
into a predominantly residential neighborhood containing open
space and commercial, public, institutional and community facil-
ities. 255 The court stated: "To hold that ... redevelopment of such
areas as contemplated here [is] not [a] public [use], is to view pres-
ent day conditions under the myopic eyes of years now gone." 256
Blighted area redevelopment projects have not been restricted to
redevelopment for primarily residential uses. In Schenck v. Pitts-
burgh,257 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected plaintiff's ar-
ernmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their
view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved
impracticable in other fields.
2533 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954). See also Foeller v. Housing Authority
of Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1952) (redevelopment authorities have the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain pursuant to a redevelopment proposal
even though the area may be predominantly open, vacant, or unimproved); Rubinoff
v. District Court, 145 Coo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961); Zisook v. Maryland-Drexel
Neighborhood Redevelopment Corp., 3 Ill. 2d 570, 121 N.E.2d 804 (1954).
2543 IIl. 2d at 545, 121 N.E.2d at 795. Similarly, no force was found in the in
terrorem argument that; if the use of eminent domain in the prevention of slums is per-
mitted, "every piece of property in the city or state can be condemned to prevent it
from becoming a slum. [Legitimate use of governmental power]," the court reasoned,
"is not prohibited because of the possibility that the power may be abused." Id.
25 Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266
P.2d 105, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
256 122 Cal. App. 2d at 803, 266 P.2d at 122.
257364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).
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gument that redevelopment must be limited primarily to relieving
undesirable living conditions and upheld condemnation for the re-
habilitation of a deteriorating business section of Pittsburgh. And
in People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commis-
sion, 5 8 the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a project which would
transform a blighted vacant area into an industrial zone. The court
concluded that the elimination of a blighted vacant area in itself
satisfies the public use requirement, regardless of the type of rede-
velopment that occurs thereafter.
Redevelopment of nonblighted areas has also been upheld. In
Cannata v. New York,259 condemnation was authorized for the pur-
pose of reclaiming and redeveloping economically deficient areas
which impaired the sound growth of the community. In upholding
condemnation of an area that showed no tangible physical blight
and was designated to become an industrial park, the New York
court stated that "an area does not have to be a 'slum' one to make
its redevelopment a public use, nor is public use negated by a plan
to turn a predominantly vacant, poorly developed and organized
area into a site for industrial buildings. ' 260
The governing principles, then, are the same under most state
constitutions as they are under the Federal Constitution. If the
goals of a governmental project are beneficial to the community
and the use of condemned property bears a reasonable relation to
these goals, then the public use requirement is not a bar to condem-
nation. And possibly more important, a legislative determination
of the appropriateness of condemnation is accorded a very strong
presumption of validity:26' in few modern cases has a court found
258 14 Il. 2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792 (1958). See also Oliver v. Clairton, 374 Pa. 333,
98 A.2d 47 (1953) (upholding project to take an area which was 53.8 percent resi-
dential and redevelop it into an area containing primarily commercial and industrial
uses).
259 11 N.Y.2d 710, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962).
260 Id. at 712, 182 N.E.2d 397, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 906. See also Graham v. Houlihan,
147 Conn. 321, 329, 160 A.2d 745, 750 (1960) ("In these days of advanced city plan-
ning and urban improvement, the city authorities could properly conclude that there was
a probability of greater benefit to the community if the land in the area were put to
better use."); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar
Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946); Hawkins v.
Greenfield, 248 Ind. 593, 230 N.E.2d 396 (1967); Courtesy Sandwich Shop Inc. v.
Port of New York Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963);
Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958);
Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
281 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954): "Subject to specific consti-
tutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken the public interest has been de-
clared in terms well-nigh conclusive."
PUBLIC LAND BANKING
that public use was not what the legislature had determined it to be.
Although promoting orderly urban growth differs in some ways from
slum rehabilitation, slum prevention and the like, it is extremely
unlikely that a court that has sanctioned these latter programs would
hold, contrary to a legislative determination, that curbing urban
sprawl and maintaining rational growth were not a public purpose.
Innumerable reports, books, and articles attest to the enormity of
the social and economic costs of disorderly urban growth, costs
which could be largely reduced. Nor is it likely that such a court
would conclude, again faced with a contrary legislative determina-
tion, that land banking was an unreasonable or irrational means of
ordering urban development.
Land banking, in fact, is designed to succeed where established
programs of slum clearance, urban renewal, economic rejuvenation
and the like have failed, because it represents a more comprehen-
sive and integrated approach to the problems of urban deterioration
and because it focuses attention on the urban fringe, as well as the
inner city. Past programs have by and large failed to make sub-
stantial improvements in the urban environment because they have
taken more limited approaches - limited by being subject to piece-
meal, rather than comprehensive planning,"' and by concentrating
on the urban core to the exclusion of the fringe. Concentration on
the fringe is crucial because of the immediate nexus between urban
decay and uncontrolled urban expansion.
For example, poor housing conditions are magnified when pri-
vate landowners hold property in the urban fringe for long periods
of time in anticipation of increased market value. This speculative
withholding of property, coupled with low-density suburban zon-
ing,263 increases the cost of property available for residential devel-
opment.264  Consequently, the price of housing is elevated beyond
2 6 2 
"[P~lanning in urban renewal is limited to the municipality in which the pro-
gram is to be conducted. This emphasis is unfortunate. It inhibits any program which
is directed in part to the improvement of the housing supply since housing demands and
housing needs are regional in nature." Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Re-
quirement in Urban Renewal, 116 U. PA. L REV. 25, 28 (1967).
263 For a discussion of low-density, or large-lot zoning, see Note, The Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and James, 81 YALE UJ. 61
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Zoning]; Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE
LJ. 1418 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
264 Whether zoning or speculation contributes more to the artificial shortage of
land available for residential development is uncertain. In any event, the impact of the
artificial shortage is clearly significant. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, supra, note 22,
at 13.
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the reach of many who are left with no alternative but to live in the
deteriorating central cities.2 65  At the same time, most of the new
clerical, unskilled and semiskilled jobs in metropolitan areas are
being created in the suburbs and beyond; those who must reside in
the central city are thus impeded in their access to the most rapidly
growing job markets.2 66  Obviously, this sequence of events cannot
be altered without controlling the land market in the urban fringe.2 6
A public land bank, by acquiring land at the urban fringe, by con-
trolling the inflation of land values,268 and by providing better
quality, less expensive public services and facilities for newly de-
veloped areas,26 would make more realistic the possibility of decent
housing for low- and moderate-income families near new employ-
ment centers.270 Indeed, comprehensive control of fringe area de-
2 6 5 See Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 263, at 62. The National Commission on
Civil Disorders concluded: "To continue present [land use] policies is to make perma-
nent the division of our country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located
in central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs."
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 22 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
266 See Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 263, at 62. See also Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa.
237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970):
Figures show that most jobs that are being created in urban areas . .. are in
the suburbs.... Thus the suburbs, which at one time were merely "bedrooms"
for those who worked in the urban core, are now becoming active business
areas in their own right. It follows then that formerly "outlying," somewhat
rural communities, are now becoming logical areas for development and pop-
ulation growth - in a sense, suburbs to the suburbs.
267 To control land use in the urban fringe, it is necessary to keep fringe area land
free from premature private development. In some cases this will require holding on
to acquired land for several years before disposing of it for development consistent with
a master plan for the area. Although a few courts have prohibited takings for projects
which will not be implemented in the immediate future on the grounds that property
may not be condemned for a speculative or remote future use (see, e.g., Board of Educa-
tion v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954)), the rationale of such cases
does not apply to land banking because land will not be acquired by a land bank for
either speculative or remote future uses. On the contrary, acquired land will be put to
public use at the moment of its acquisition because, from that time on, it is serving to
implement the land bank's public objectives: curbing urban sprawl, perfecting the land
market by controlling inflation, etc. Moreover, since the use to which condemned prop-
erty is finally put is no longer the test of whether property is being taken for public use,
it is largely irrelevant to what use the property is finally put as long as it is put to a use
which bears a reasonable relation to the goals of the legislative program.
A land bank, pursuant to enabling legislation, will dispose of land with restrictions
which will guarantee that land use will be consistent with a master plan for the area -
much as is done in the typical urban renewal project (see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 30 (1954)). Therefore, courts will probably find that a land banking pro-
gram provides sufficient guarantees that the land will be used in a way reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of the land bank.
2 6 8 See notes 180-87 supra & accompanying text.
269 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
270 See e.g., notes 95-97, 119-21 supra & accompanying text.
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velopment appears to be the only plausible way to accommodate a
growing population without magnifying present urban disorders.2 7'
B. Commonwealth v. Rosso
So far, only one case has tested the foregoing conclusion - that
a land bank could rely on the power of condemnation to implement
its programs - and there it was resoundingly affirmed. In a unan-
imous and exhaustive opinion, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
upheld legislation" 2 specifically providing for land reservation as a
means of promoting the efficient utilization of land.7
Act 13, passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico in
May, 1962, created the Puerto Rico Land Administration, a public
corporation authorized to "acquire ... private property and keep it
in reserve, for the benefit of the people of Puerto Rico."274 The Act
contemplated that land would be acquired both by purchase and by
the exercise of the power of eminent domain,275 and would be held
in reserve for an unspecified period without any particular future
use being designated at the time of a taking. 76 The Rossos', whose
land had been designated for condemnation pursuant to the Act,
contended that the public use doctrine - under both the United
States and Puerto Rico Constitutions277  
_ prohibited the Common-
wealth from condemning private property until there was a specific
plan for the land and a clear public necessity for doing so. The low-
er court, reluctant to allow expansion of governmental power at the
expense of individual property rights, took a rather traditional view
271 See, e.g., Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970, Pub.
L No. 91-609, tit VII, 84 Stat. 1791 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 40,42 U.S.C.)
(providing for the development of a national growth plan, and encouraging the rational,
orderly, efficient and economic growth of our metropolitan area).
272 Puerto Rican Land Administration Act of May 16, 1962, No. 13.
273... P.R. . (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (per curiam)
(Translated excerpts of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico appear in
Callies, supra note 94. The case is also translated, in full, in Brief for Appellant, app.
B, Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 393 U.S. 14 (1968)).
274 P.R. L&ws ANN. tit 23, § 7(q) (1964).
275 Id. § 311f(j).
270ld. Although the Act provides for reserving land specifically for preserving
open space, it has a far greater reach than open space legislation such as 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1500-1500e (Supp. 1972), in that it also provides for short- and long-term reservation
of land for other purposes.
277 The Puerto Rico Constitution, like the constitutions of most states, has a section
similar to the fifth amendment just compensation provision of the Federal Constitution:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except upon payment ofjust compensation, and in the manner provided by law." P.R. CONST. art. 2, § 9.
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of the matter.278 In upholding the Rossos' contentions, the court
stated that "[t]he necessity which justifies an expropriation is that
which exists in the present or in the immediate future and is re-
quired for the expropriation itself. . . . Private property . . cannot
be expropriated for a use which is not revealed. '' 279  But on appeal,
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed, holding Act 13 consti-
tutional in all respects, and stating that the Act constituted a "legit-
imate use of public power in protection of that which a community
of 2,712,808 human beings existing in a territory of 3,435 square
miles sees as a most precious value for survival: vital space.'"'28
The court enumerated at length the social, economic, and moral
justifications for its decision.28' Reference was made to the legisla-
tive finding that only a publicly constituted body with broad powers
of land acquisition and regulation could assist the Commonwealth
in carrying out of its public policy of industrial, commercial and
housing development, and of providing public services so that there
may be an orderly development in keeping with the master plans,
and of more effectively meeting its governmental responsibility of
preserving the health, safety, and welfare of the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico at the highest level compatible with community re-
sources.
282
In discussing the legal issues, the court stressed that strict limita-
tions upon governmental authority would unnecessarily and unwisely
exalt private property rights vis-a-vis the common needs. It found
the views of the trial court "somewhat out of focus in these present
times,""8 and saw no need to distinguish the concepts of public
use and public or social benefit. Instead, the court assumed that
under the circumstances there could be little question that "social
benefit" was synonymous with "public use," and that a showing of
social benefit was sufficient to legitimate the exercise of eminent do-
main.284  Finding that the legislature might reasonably have con-
2 8 Puerto Rico v. Rosso, Civil No. E-63-1652 (P.R. Super. Ct. 1964) (Translated
excerpts of the court's opinion appear in Callies, supra note 94. The case is also trans-
lated, in full, in Brief for Appellant, supra note 273).
279 Callies, supra note 94, at 206.
2 801d. at 199.
2 8 1 The overriding theme of the opinion is the court's belief that unplanned, unreg-
ulated land-use has been highly detrimental to the welfare of the island. Numerous sta-
tistics were cited depicting the explosive growth of the Commonwealth from which the
court could conclude, as had the legislature, that broad powers were necessary to effi-
ciently utilize a dwindling supply of open space.
282 Puerto Rican Land Administration Act of May 16, 1962, No. 13, Statement of
Motives 5 (d).
283 Callies, supra note 94, at 207-08.
284 The equation stemmed in part from a recent amendment to Article 282 of the
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sidered the indeterminate reservation of land for future, unspecified
uses to be of social benefit to the Commonwealth, the court refused
to interfere with "the ways and means which the legislature or its
delegated organ [chosel to exercise the power of expropriation [or]
with a selection they [had] made of the land to be expropriated. 285
The Rossos' appealed the decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, but to no avail.
In a short per curiam opinion without dissent, the Court granted
the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the case failed to present a substantial federal question.286
Presumably, then, the Supreme Court of the United States is in full
agreement with the High Court of Puerto Rico: land banking -
while not factually identical to other examples of eminent domain
cases that have received the sanction of the courts - falls easily
within existing constitutional principles that have been established
to regulate government takings.8 7
Of course, the fact that the Federal Constitution is construed
to permit land banking is not determinative of whether an individ-
ual state will approve the idea under its own constitution and legis-
1902 Civil Code (Puerto Rican) which broadened the permissible grounds for con-
demnation to include "social benefit" as well as "public use." Callies, supra note 94,
at 208. However, the amendment would seem to be but a small factor in the decision.
In the 61 page opinion, the court devoted barely four paragraphs to the amendment.
285 Id.
286 Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (per curiam).
287 It is not entirely obvious what precedential value is entailed in a case dismissed
by the Supreme Court "for want of a substantial federal question." But looking to
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922), where the Court first disposed of a case in this
fashion, it appears that such a dismissal at least approaches a decision on the merits to
the effect that the federal issue raised is rejected. One might even contend that these
cases constitute unusually strong authority because the Court essentially is deeming the
issues raised (whether they be of constitutional dimension or concerned with federal
statutory law) to be patently frivolous.
An interesting aspect of the Rosso case that was never mentioned in either the Puerto
Rican opinions or the briefs before the United States Supreme Court is whether the fed-
eral restrictions on government takings even apply to the Commonwealth. See Brief
for Appellant at 28-37, Brief for Appellee at 1-9, Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 393 U.S. 14
(1971). The extent to which the Federal Constitution applies in Puerto Rico is in no
way a settled question. See generally Helfeld, How Much of the Federal Constitution
is Likely to be Held Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 39 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 169 (1970). It seems completely implausible that the Court's dismissal of the
appeal was predicated on the inapplicability of the taking restrictions in Puerto Rico,
however, since their applicability would at least constitute a "substantial question." See
id. It is peculiar that both the Rossos' and the Commonwealth's briefs never discussed
this point. Instead, they simply discussed whether the condemnation was consonant
with general due process - which no one disputes is applicable in Puerto Rico (see,
e.g., Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718, 722-23 (1st Cir. 1968) ) - and then
proceeded to discuss the legal issue as if it were wholly one of eminent domain, citing
Berman v. Parker and the like.
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lation. The ultimate test will be in the state courts, but here, as in
the Supreme Courts of both the United States and Puerto Rico,
the legal stage seems set for a ready acceptance of this new exten-
sion of established programs.
VIII. FINANCING AND OPERATING THE LAND BANK
To effectively control the pace and direction of urban growth,
it is evident that the land bank must have a considerable inventory
of land at its disposal. The amount of land required by the land
bank, of course, will vary from city to city, depending upon the
physical, economic, and social characteristics of the area and the
bank's strategies and objectives. The intricacies of these variables
render quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the necessary pub-
lic investments extremely complex. In one effort to make such an
estimate, however, the Urban Land Research Analysts Corporation
did conclude that land banks would be financially feasible, even
for the largest metropolitan areas. According to its estimate, the
maximum investment required for a land bank to control the growth
of a metropolitan area containing 2.5 million people would be on
the order of $250 million, and with an investment of half that
amount, a considerable impact might still be made.288 While studies
to refute or corroborate these calculations are not available, it is
indisputable that land banking will entail substantial new public
investments.
In view of the large sums of money required and the long-term
goals involved, it is unlikely that a land bank could be expected to
enter into a fully operational phase by immediately acquiring all
the land necessary to actualize its objectives. Instead, both the
financing and the operation of the bank must evolve in incremental
stages. During the land bank's early stages, 289 before full operating
288 See W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 236-37.
2 89 The process of selecting parcels of land for acquisition during the initial phases
of operation can be broken down into two components. Initially, on the macro-level,
are those decisions which are determined by a comprehensive plan which sets forth the
desirable development and growth pattern for the metropolitan area. This plan should,
to a large degree, incorporate the individual plans of the municipalities within the land
bank's jurisdiction. That is, the development and growth objectives of these cities, as
reflected in their own plans, should be given the utmost consideration as long as they
do not conflict with or infringe upon the desirable growth pattern of the region or met-
ropolitan area as an integrated whole.
On the micro-level are those decisions to be made between individual parcels of
land within the more broadly defined development areas. The inherent financial lim-
itations imposed on initial acquisitions can make this an either-or, now or never decision.
While no general formulas can be designed to make such decisions automatic or in-
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status is achieved, there would be a continuing need for additional
capital with little, if any, offsetting revenue.290  The length of this
initial period may well be a number of years.29'
Once attaining an operational inventory, the land bank would
begin the continuous process of selling or leasing land to private
developers, as it becomes ready for development, and simultane-
ously acquiring cheaper land on the outskirts of the city to fore-
stall premature development. By virtue of its lower holding costs "
2
fallible, certain techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis, can be utilized to ensure that
components of rational decision-making are present.
29 Interim uses might generate some revenue during this period. See note 293 infra.
291 In instances of advance land acquisition for public purposes, land has been held
in reserve for up to 11 years. See Shoup & Mack supra note 40, at 93. In urban re-
newal projects, it has not been unusual to have gaps of 10 to 15 years between site
acquisition and disposition. Although these examples of public land acquisition are
not identical to potential American land banking programs, they are indicative of the
lengthy periods of time involved from the purchase of land to its ultimate disposition.
2 92 The federal tax exemption on the interest of the land bank's obligations, under
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103, would allow for low borrowing rates which, in conjunc-
tion with the public entity's exemption from state and local property taxes, would yield
lower overall holding costs. (To take full advantage of the tax exemption on the in-
terest of its obligations, of course, the land bank's obligations would have to be high-
quality. Otherwise, investors would demand a higher rate of interest which could negate
the value of the tax exemption and could push the borrowing costs of the public entity
beyond those of a private developer.)
In comparison with private enterprises, the land bank also has a substantial cost
advantage by virtue of its exemption from income tax. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 115
excludes from gross income any income derived from the exercise of any essential gov-
ernmental function and accruing to a state or a political subdivision thereof. The pur-
pose of the exemption is to ensure that state and local governments will not be hampered
in the performance of their functions by federal income taxes. Maryland Savings-Share
Ins. Corp. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md.), reversed on other grounds, 400
U.S. 4 (1970) (per curiam). The purpose of this section, however, is not to exempt
an enterprise carried on by the state which normally would be within the rubric of tax-
able private enterprises and is distinct from the usual governmental functions. Helver-
ing v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934). Thus, a state cannot withdraw sources of
revenue from federal taxing power by engaging in businesses such as liquor sales. Ohio
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934).
Income generated by a land bank should be exempt under section 115 since: (1)
the land bank would be engaged in such typical governmental activity as development
of sites for parks, housing, and commercial uses, as well as construction of sewers, roads,
water lines and other public utilities and services; and (2) the land bank, if properly
constituted, would be a political subdivision of the state, and hence any income accruing
to the land bank would accrue to a political subdivision of the state.
Public institutions generally have been exempt from local property taxation. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970). Since this exemption can significantly reduce
holding costs, it seems that land banks too would seek to have their lands removed from
the local property tax roles. While American property tax has been vociferously criti-
cized over the last century as regressive and uneconomic, it still continues to account for
almost one-half of local general revenues from all sources. D. NETZER, supra note 160,
at vii. This would indicate that the concentration by a land bank of tax exempt lands
in suburban areas may have a noticeable impact on local tax revenues and hence on local
spending power.
On closer examination, however, this apparent loss-of-tax may not occur at all.
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and revenue accrued from leasing policies293 and ultimate disposal, 4
the land bank may generate substantial profits. On the other
hand, acquiring and holding land out of productive use indefinitely,
or disposing of land at a price below market value to subsidize
certain public or private uses, may create financial losses. Thus,
whether the land bank would ever be financially self-sustaining
depends on its overall objectives and implementing strategies.
A. Direct Government Funding
There are two possible sources for financing a land bank as a
public corporation: direct government aid in the form of grants or
loans, and the bank's own obligations of indebtedness. At least
during the initial build-up phase, when capital costs and operating
expenses would exceed revenue, direct government assistance would
be particularly useful. In view of the serious fiscal constraints con-
fronting most municipal governments, it is doubful that significant
funding could be provided at the local level. Some aid, however,
may be available on the state level, either as long-term, low-interest
loans or direct subsidies. Although state governments traditionally
have been rather indifferent to urban problems, their attitudes are
beginning to change. Many states are now engaged in programs
for the financing and development of urban housing;295 others have
programs to provide financial assistance to local governments for the
acquisition of land to meet the recreation and conservation needs
of expanding urban populations."9 6 Nonetheless, state governments
When the land bank eventually disposes of land, the property tax exemption will cease.
Since much of the property transferred to private hands for active use will often have a
much greater value than when it was acquired by the land bank (because of site prepar-
ation, capital improvements, and the announcement of development plans), the total
value of the land on the tax roles will eventually be increased.
Alternatively, enabling legislation might provide for some form of payment in lieu
of taxes to compensate the municipality for lost tax revenues. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§
1410(h)-(k) (1970). A formula which would allow the municipality to share in the
appreciated value of land in the reserve would be one such approach.
293 Temporary use of the land, during the period between acquisition and disposi-
tion, may produce rents and revenues that can offset operating costs. Land in the metro-
politan fringes that is currently in agricultural use, might be acquired and leased back for
interim use. So too might irregular parcels of land closer-in be used for parking lots,
etc.
294 Land acquired on the fringe in the path of urban expansion would be virtually
ensured of increasing value as the demand for its development increased.
295 See generally, Beckman, Development of National Urban Growth Policy, 37 J.
AM. INSTITUTE OF PLAN. 146, 154-59 (1970); Streeter, Davies & Brooks, State Legis-
lative Response to the Housing Crisis, 19 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 63 (1970).
296 Land purchase programs exist in at least seven states. See G. EDWARDS, supra
note 7, at 126.
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alone would probably be unable or unwilling to meet the full bur-
den of initial land acquisition needs, 297 and thus a greater role for
the Federal Government is indicated.
The Federal Government dearly has the financial capacity, and
probably the inclination, to assist public land banking. In the past,
billions of dollars have been expended through numerous federal
programs to assist local government bodies in acquiring land for
various purposes, some of which have been very similar to the pur-
poses of land banking.298 Some of the current federal programs,
in fact, might directly authorize federal assistance to local land bank
programs, particularly if they were slightly modified by amendment.
The federal urban renewal program, 99 for example, might pro-
vide a source for funds. To date, urban renewal has been the
most significant federally initiated effort involving public acquisition
and disposition of urban land. Title I provides federal assistance,
in the form of grants and loans, to a local public agency for land
assembly, clearance, and site preparation, among other things, pur-
suant to local programs designed to eliminate and prevent slums
and blight and to renew and revitalize urban areas. The Federal
Government generally pays for two-thirds of the aggregate "net
project cost,"300 which is computed by subtracting the value of re-
sold land (plus certain capital value of leased property) from the
gross project cost.3 ' The remaining one-third of the project cost
is absorbed by the local government. 02 About $6 billion of federal
297 Although state governments have evinced a fairly substantial capacity and indina-
tion to assist local governments making capital outlays for schools and roads, the states
have been much more reluctant to provide assistance for any other kinds of capital out-
lays. See Adams & McLoone, State Aids for Local Puablic Facilities, in PUBLIC FACILITY
FINANCING, supra note 188, at 77. This same study concluded that "State aid for capital
outlay has been small and is not likely to increase considerably without a significant
change in the role taken by the States with respect to local governments." Id. at 91.
For one thing, state governments, unlike the Federal Government, have a tradition of
using their aid to local governments primarily to assist with payments for operating ex-
penses, rather than for capital outlays. Id. at 78.
_
98 G. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 124.
29942 U.S.C. § 1452 (a) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 15, 1949, tit.
1, ch. 338, § 102(a), 63 Stat. 414).
300 Id. § 1453(a) (2). The Government will pay three-fourths of the net project
cost of any projects: (1) in a municipality of 50,000 or less; (2) in a municipality
which is situated in a hardship or "redevelopment" area; or (3) which the Secretary of
HUD may specifically approve for the higher rate. Id. § 1453(2) (B) -(C).
301 d. § 1460(f).
3021d. § 1454.
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money has been spent in accordance with this formula in the years
following the initiation of the program in 1949.03
In the past, the urban renewal process has differed from the
redevelopment component 0 4 of land banking in two respects: urban
renewal has been essentially concerned with the acquisition and dis-
position of developed land - the proper use of which is inhibited
by the presence of deteriorated structures or blighted conditions -
and it has tended to focus on relatively small areas. A 1970 amend-
ment to the urban renewal program, however, seems to go a long
way towards eliminating these distinctions by modifying the old
requirement that an urban renewal area be a slum, blighted, de-
teriorated, or deteriorating area. The program now includes proj-
ects for the acquisition of
open land necessary for sound community growth which is to be
developed for predominantly residential uses, or . . . land or space
which is vacant, unused, underused, or inappropriately used ....
which land or space the Secretary [of HUD] determines may be
developed (at a cost reasonably related to the public purpose to be
served) without major residential clearance activities, and with full
consideration to the preservation of beneficial aspects of the urban
and natural environment, for such uses as are consistent with em-
phasis on housing for low- and moderate-income families, includ-
ing the provision of schools, hospitals, parks, and other essential
public facilities, and, where appropriate, all uses associated with
new communities in town or similar large scale undertakings re-
lated to inner city needs . .. .30
Such projects could reasonably be undertaken by a land bank.
Indeed, the land bank entity would seem to easily fit within the
definition of a "local public agency;" 306 and the statute encourages
the operations of such local public entities as the land bank which
are established on a State, or regional (within a State), or unified
metropolitan basis or [which] are established on such other basis
as permits such agencies to contribute effectively toward the solu-
tion of community development or redevelopment problems on a
State, or regional (within a State), or unified basis.307
Other legislation might more directly authorize federal assistance
3 0 3 THE NAT'L HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 38, ch.
III, pt. 1, at 10.
304 See discussion of a land bank's possible role in urban renewal, notes 163-71 supra
& accompanying text.
30542 U.S.C.A. § 1460(c) (1) (v) (Supp. 1972).
06 " 'Local public agency' means any State, county, municipality, or other govern-
mental entity or public body ... authorized to undertake the project for which assis-
tance is sought." 42 U.S.C. § 1460(h) ( 1970).
307 Id. § 1451 (b).
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to a local land banking program. The Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1970, authorizes grants to state and local public bodies
for up to 75 percent of the acquisition costs of
undeveloped or predominantly undeveloped land which, if with-
held from commercial, industrial, and residential development,
would have special significance in helping to shape economic and
desirable patterns of growth (including growth outside of exist-
ing urban areas which is directly related to the development of new
communities or the expansion and revitalization of existing com-
munities) .... 308
An express purpose of this chapter is to help curb urban sprawl
and prevent the spread of urban blight and deterioration in the face
of rapid population growth and rapidly expanding urban areas.
Prior to the Housing and Urban Development Act of, 1970, it
was extremely difficult to convert vacant land acquired with grants
under title VII of the Housing Act of 1961 to uses other than open
space.3 With the new emphasis on rational and orderly develop-
ment brought about by the 1970 act, however, Congress has dem-
onstrated a much greater willingness to allow the conversion of
open space, when such change is warranted by the exigencies of
urban growth.-1°
The Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of
1970' may also authorize funding for land banking. The Act
provides for financial assistance to private developers and state and
local public bodies, including regional or metropolitan public bodies
and agencies, to encourage "the orderly development of well-
planned, diversified, and economically sound new communities, in-
cluding major additions to existing communities . *.... 12 A land
bank, as a "state land development agency," 33 would be eligible to
30842 U.S.C.A. § 1500c-2 (Supp. 1972).
309 Such conversions were allowed only if the Secretary of HUD found that the con-
version was essential to the orderly development and growth of the area involved and
only if the local body assured "the substitution of other openspace land of at least equal
fair market value and of as nearly as feasible equivalent usefulness and location." 42
U.S.C. § 1500c (1970), amended, Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, tit. IV,
§ 401, 84 Stat. 1782.
3 10 The new law reads:
In the case of any interests [in land] acquired pursuant to [section 1500c-2],
the Secretary may approve the subsequent conversion or disposition of the land
involved without regard to other requirements of this chapter but subject to
such terms and conditions as he determines equitable and appropriate with
respect to the control of future use .... Id. § 1500c-2 (emphasis added).
311 Pub. L. No. 91-609, tit. VII, 84 Stat. 1791 (codified in scattered sections of 12,
40, 42 U.S.C.).
31242 U.S.C. § 4511(f) (1970).
aia A "State land development agency" is defined as "any State or local public body
1972] -
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:897
receive federal guarantees on its bonds and notes, as well as federal
loans for the purpose of meeting interest payments on its indebted-
ness. 3 14  Planning assistance, up to two-thirds of cost, would also be
available,315 as would be direct grants to cover the costs of interim
public services prior to the establishment of permanent services.316
In addition, the land bank would be eligible to receive grants to
assist construction of public facilities whenever it is conducting a
-new community assistance project," as defined in the Act.?1 '
B. Debt Financing
In the absence of a massive infusion of federal money into
land banking programs, the principal source of funding would
have to be debt financing. As a public corporation, the land bank
would be empowered to issue negotiable bonds and notes in amounts
sufficient to finance its land acquisitions.318 The debt would be
secured by a pledge of any revenues or receipts of the corporation
or by a mortgage covering all or part of its holdings.319 Because
the land bank will probably operate at a loss during its early stages,
it must have a source of funds available to cover its initial debt
maintenance expenses, as well as its capital outlays. Some part of
the interest costs can be met by overissuing at the time of the orig-
inal bond offering - a common technique by which a public or
private entity sells more debentures than necessary to finance a
project, specifically intending to use the excess to pay the interest
expenses on the bonds for the first few years.3"
The tax-exempt status of land bank bonds"' would make pos-
or agency with authority to act as developer in carrying out one or more new commu-
nity development programs." Id. § 4512(c).
314 See notes 341-43 infra & accompanying text.
31542 U.S.C. § 4521 (1970).
316 Id. § 4516.
317 Id. § 4519. A "new community assistance project" is a project assisted by grants
under a number of specific federal statutes, as enumerated in id. One such statute is
title VII of the Housing Act of 1961, which, as amended by the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1970, should easily encompass the operations of a typical land bank.
318 See discussion of attributes of a public corporation in text accompanying notes
201-10 supra.
319 See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6269(1) (McKinney 1971).
320 This technique is rarely, if ever, used for a project where revenues will not attain
a level adequate to cover the debt maintenance expenses within a period of a few years.
Investors probably would be unwilling to purchase bonds in a project where their own
investment was the only security over a longer period of time. If government aid is
provided to the bank to assist it in meeting its debt service (as will be discussed below),
however, the fears of investors would most likely be dispelled.
321 See note 210 supra.
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sible a relatively low borrowing rate which, when reflected in
diminished monthly carrying charges, could lead to substantial sav-
ings. It is generally conceded, however, that bonds of newly orga-
nized public corporations and municipal authorities bear a higher
rate of interest than municipal and state bonds backed by their re-
spective governments. 32 2  The new public corporation must pay
higher rates because it has no taxing power, lacks a financial his-
tory, and may be subject to unknown difficulties in securing rev-
enue.3 Not only would each of these considerations apply when a
land bank is formed, but the fact that the land bank would not
begin to generate its own revenues until a substantial inventory is
built up would further tend to intensify the marketing difficulties
associated with its bond issues3 The land bank may thus find it
difficult to raise capital at a low rate of interest, or even market its
bonds in the first place, unless there is an ancillary pledge of secu-
rity from some proven source such as the government.
One successful approach for providing such security to newly
formed public bodies is illustrated by the act which created the
New York State Housing Finance Agency (HFA), a public benefit
corporation established in 1960 for the purpose of providing direct
mortgage financing to limited profit housing companies 25 New
York, like a number of other states, is constitutionally prohibited
from guaranteeing the bonds of a public corporation without first
securing approval in a referendum3 2' To avoid this difficulty and
still create financally attractive bonds, the act established a "capital
reserve fund," into which the HFA must pay: (1) all money re-
ceived from the state for the purposes of the fund; (2) the pro-
ceeds from the sale of certain bonds and notes;32 and (3) any
3 22 See Alderfer, supra note 201.
323 Other reasons that have been listed include: the absence of mortgage features;
the extra-long life of the bonds' and the magnitude of the bond issue. See id.
324 On the other hand, the land bank will be dealing with real estate - which time
has proven to be a commodity virtually certain of increasing in market value - and
this should be one factor tending to increase the attractiveness of its bonds.
32N.Y. PRIv. HOuS. FIN. LAW § 43 (McKinney Supp. 1971). See generally
Morris, The Development of New Middle Income Housing in New York, 10 N.Y.L.
FORUM 492, 508 (1964).
The drafting of the act creating the HFA and its debt reserve fund has been attrib-
uted to former Attorney General John Mitchell. Reilly & Schulman, The State Urban
Development Corporation: New York's Innovation, 1 URBAN LAWYER 129, 135
(1969).
326 N.Y. CoNsT., art. VII, § 8.
3 27 The included notes and bonds are all notes and bonds except for a number of
special kinds which are listed in N.Y. Piuv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 47(1) (a) (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
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other money made available for the purposes of the fund.2 8 Also,
the HFA is allowed to withdraw from the fund only to the extent
that the total amount in reserve is sufficient to cover all of the prin-
cipal and interest becoming due on certain bonds12 1 in the succeed-
ing year; 330 and it cannot make further issuances unless the reserve
is adequate to cover what would be the increased amount of prin-
cipal and interest becoming due in the succeeding year.-"' The
critical feature of the capital reserve fund lies in the state's purported
obligation of support. Should the reserve fund not reach the
level required to meet the succeeding year's payments, the legislature
is committed to appropriate such amounts as are necessary to restore
it to that level. 32  This technique is a legislative obligation short
of a pledge of the full faith and credit of the state,333 but adequate
to transform relatively speculative securities into very marketable
bonds. In fact, as of 1970, approximately $1.9 billion worth of
bonds had been issued by the HFA pursuant to the reserve fund
scheme,334 and they sold at rates well below New York City's bonds
and just slightly higher than the state's own bonds.335
8281d.
329 See note 327 supra.
330 N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 47(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
3311d. § 47(1) (b).
332Id. § 47(1) (d).
=3 Professors Quirk and Wein cogently argue that this "blank check" on the state
treasury violates no less than four state constitutional provisions. The most significant
violation is that of article VII, section 8, which they read as expressly forbidding such
guarantee by providing that the "credit of the state" shall not "be given or loaned to or
in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation or association .... " N.Y.
CONST., art. VII, § 8. Their position, with regard to the Housing Finance Agency stat-
ute, is that it
provides in unequivocal terms that the state shall guarantee the debt of the
HFA. The guarantee is not direct; rather, it provides that if the HFA reserve
for the payment of principal and interest is insufficient then the HFA shall
draw a "blank check" on the state treasury and the needed amount "shall be
annually apportioned and paid to the agency." It requires a peculiar mind
to draw a distinction between a direct guarantee of the bonds and a guarantee
of a fund out of which the bonds will be paid. That, however, is the theory
of the statute. Quirk & Wein, supra note 208, at 591, 585-629.
A similar argument, this time addressed to the constitutionality of the financing of the
State Urban Development Corporation, is made in Quirk & Wein, Homeownership for
the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,
and the Rockefeller Program, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 857-62 (1969).
334 Quirk & Wein, supra note 208, at 586.
335 Recently, those bonds of the HFA that were secured by the reserve fund sold at
one-quarter percent higher than the state's bonds, and up to one and one-quarter percent
lower than New York City's bonds. Reilly & Schulman, supra note 325, at 135.
Approximately $6.5 billion of bonds had been sold by 1970 in New York under
similar schemes. Quirk & Wein, supra note 208. See also N.Y. Times, March 14, 1972,
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This scheme has been used to make marketable the bonds of a
number of other public corporations in New York,336 most notably
the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC). 3
The UDC is authorized to create reserve funds under constraints
similar to those applying to the HFA,38 and the legislature is again
committed to appropriate any amount necessary to restore the funds
to a level that would cover the principal and interest becoming due
in any succeeding calendar year on the bonds secured by the
funds.33 The UDC has enjoyed success similar to the HFA's.34 °
Whether other state legislatures will follow the New York lead
in supporting the bonds of public corporations will clearly depend
on prevailing political moods, as well as the applicable constitu-
tional frameworks. But even without action on the state level,
some federal support can be expected. For example, the Urban
Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970 is one
pertinent source of federal assistance already in effect. It author-
izes certain loans to "[s]tate land development agencies for the pur-
pose of assisting them to make interest payments on indebtedness
incurred by them to finance [approved] new community develop-
ment programs."'" Moreover, the Secretary of HUD is authorized
"to guarantee, and to enter into commitments to guarantee, the
bonds [etc.) issued by or on behalf of ... State land development
agencies for the purpose [inter alia] of financing real property ac-
quisition and land development ...pursuant to [approved] new
community development programs,' 342 with the full faith and credit
at 1, col. 1, which discusses the relative quality ratings of HFA, UDC, and New York
State's own bonds.
336 E.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 378 (McKinney 1969) (State University Construction
Fund, 1962); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 7381-406 (McKinney Supp. 1971) (New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, 1969); id. §§ 4401-17 (Health and Men-
tal Hygiene Facilities Improvement Corporation, 1968).
3 3 7 NY. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1971). See text accom-
panying notes 134-42 supra.
3 3 8N.Y UNCONSOL. LAws § 6270 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
339 Id. § 6270 (3).
3 40 See N.Y. Times, supra note 335.
34142 U.S.C. § 4515 (a) (1970).
342 Id. § 4515 (a). Note that the Act forbids guarantees on obligations of any state
land development agency if the income from such obligation is exempt from federal
taxation. Id. At first blush this poses a dilemma in that the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 103 (a) provides a blanket exemption for obligations issued by any political subdi-
vision of a state. The apparent difficulty is obviated by a rather obscure provision which
mandates inclusion in gross income of interest received by the purchaser of a state land
development agency obligation whenever the issuer has elected to receive federal guar-
antees on these obligations pursuant to section 4514. See 42 U.S.C. § 4530 (1970).
But the tax exemption is still maintained, in effect, for the entity because grants are au-
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of the United States pledged to the payment of such guarantees.343
In combination, these features would virtually ensure bond market-
ability and low borrowing rates.
Of paramount significance in formulating a debt-financing struc-
ture is a recognition of the possible constraints debt dependence
might impose on the flexibility of a land bank in achieving its public
objectives. In order to attract the necessary investment capital,
there must exist on the part of private investors a reasonable expec-
tation of payment of principal and interest. While government
guarantees would tend to dispel the doubts of investors, the likeli-
hood of obtaining guarantees would be similarly reduced when the
financial potential of the land bank appears questionable.34 4 Thus,
to secure debt financing, a land bank must pursue policies likely to
generate at least enough revenue to service its debt. On occasion,
such policies might conflict with optimal land use policies.
For example, a land bank may be confronted with choosing be-
tween two bids for a single site within its reserve: one of $100,000
from a private developer, the other of half that amount from the
park department. The substantial intangible benefits rendered by
an open-space recreation area might reasonably provoke the land
bank to sell the land at the lower price, even though it would "do
better" by "doing worse" from the investor's perspective. While
this inherent limitation of debt financing cannot be eliminated en-
tirely, it may be obviated in part in a number of ways - for ex-
ample, by requiring the land bank to sell to the highest bidder
willing to use the land in ways generally consistent with the master
plan for the area's development.
Another example might arise where a land bank is pursuing a
developmental subsidy strategy - i.e., "writing-down" land costs by
selling land at a loss or at cost, so as to make low- and moderate-
income housing more feasible." 5 If such an approach were to be
utilized frequently, the land bank's bonds may not be self-liquidat-
ing, or even marketable in the first place. One obvious answer to
this problem could be a statutory restraint on the extent of write-
down subsidies.
thorized to subsidize the difference between the interest paid on the taxable obligations
and that which would be paid on similar, tax-exempt obligations. Id. § 4514(a).
34-Id. § 4514(b).
344 See, e.g., id. § 4517.
3 4 5 The New York State Urban Development Corporation has not yet attempted
write-downs because of debt-financing considerations. Roberts, supra note 7, at 37
n. 209.
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C. Optimizing the Use of Available Capital
A wide array of land acquisition techniques are available to a
public land bank to assist it in meeting its financial and operational
needs. By using these techniques creatively, a land bank could sig-
nificantly reduce the amount of land that otherwise need be acquired
and minimize the amount of capital necessary to effect its objec-
tives. One method of acquiring land which could be used to ad-
vantage by a land bank is the installment land purchase. Used
frequently by private developers who prefer to keep their money
productive as long as possible so as to increase their overall rate of
return, this method of purchase would allow the land bank to take
possession under terms requiring a relatively small initial outlay of
capital. Moreover, an installment sale would give the seller the
advantage of postponing his tax liability by spreading it out over
several years and being taxed only as he receives the sale proceeds.346
This tax advantage to the seller would in turn allow the land bank
to purchase at a lower price. The advantages to the land bank
would thus be twofold: deferment of capital needs and obtain-
ment of bargaining leverage with sellers.
In periods of tight credit, an immediate cash payment by the
land bank could also result in substantial price concessions.34 7
While the seller may subject himself to capital gain taxation on
the entire gain in the year of the transfer, a consideration which
may be entirely outweighed by the need for cash in a tight money
period, the disadvantage may be obviated or at least alleviated to
the extent of special tax treatment if the sale is made as the result
of condemnation proceedings or under the threat or imminence of
condemnation. 348
Where a land bank's principal objective is to forestall prema-
ture development, its capital can be conserved by utilizing the pres-
ence of speculators holding unused land. Where a speculator de-
3 4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453. See discussion of tax deferrals in installment
sales in A. AXELROD, C. BERGER, Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANcE,
CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (Temp. ed. 1969).
347 Cash payments in combination with large-scale acquisitions have made it possible
for the UDC to purchase land at prices substantially less than the going market price.
NEw YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MEMO: UDC LAND Ac-
QUISITION (1971).
3 4 8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1033 (a). Where an authority which has power to
condemn property notifies an owner that his property will be taken and the owner sells
the property to the authority, the sale is considered to be transacted under threat or im-
minence of condemnation. The fact that the authority buys the property before it is
actually needed is irrelevant in determining whether an involuntary conversion has taken
place. 5 CCH 1972 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. g 4625 (2).
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mands a reserve price which exceeds the current market value of the
land, he is, at least temporarily, effectively removing his land from
the market and preventing its development. No purpose would be
served if the land bank used its capital to buy land that was already
protected by other means from premature development. To prevent
such development, the land bank need become involved only when
a buyer appears who intends to develop the site and who is willing
to pay the speculator's reserve price. The land bank can then con-
demn the property to prevent development, which means, of course,
that the bank's capital must finally be called upon.3 49
If the land bank is reluctant to become entangled in condemna-
tion proceedings, its capital can still be used more judiciously than
by outright purchase from the speculator. By buying a long-term
purchase option from the speculator, premature development again
can be precluded, and for a fraction of the capital necessary to
purchase the land. 350
IX. CONCLUSION
The nation's population has grown and urbanized dramatically
over the last generation. By conventional standards, many Amer-
icans have prospered; better living conditions and a broader range
of choice have accompanied rising incomes. Millions of Americans,
however, have not even had the choice of a life style. Technology
has pushed many off the land and into deteriorating cities where
they have been confined by prejudice and dwindling opportunities.
Others have been left behind in the dying villages of rural America.
Urban sprawl has devoured large regions and left many without
the services, utilities, and amenities necessary for decent living.
With jobs separated from housing, individuals and the environment
349 By maintaining a building permit process as in Richmond, Virginia the land
bank would be apprised of any contemplated development. See note 72 suepra.
350 The cost of such an option would depend on a number of variables, including the
length of the option, the exercise price, the present and projected market value of the
land, and the speculator's present and projected reserve price for the land. The position
of a speculator who sells an option is changed in two ways: he loses flexibility and li-
quidity, and he risks the possibility of losing some speculative profit (which could occur
if the market value rose above the exercise price). The price at which he would sell
an option would have to compensate him for these two factors. Thus, as the term of
the option is extended, the speculator will demand more for the option. And if the ex-
ercise price is lowered so that there becomes a reasonable chance that the market value
would transcend the exercise during the life of the option, he will similarly demand
more for the option (by roughly the amount that would be necessary to compensate for
the lost investment profit). Clearly, then, if the land bank's principal objective were
to forestall development, it would include a very high exercise price. The cost of the
option would then be a minimum, reflecting only the first of the two factors.
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have been subjugated to the automobile. Zoning and local govern-
mental devices have not worked well to create rational land use to
promote the general welfare. Instead, land has largely become a
negotiable commodity, to be despoiled at will and speculated on for
profit, its use and enjoyment subordinated to the highest bidder and
effectively removed from society at large. A new praxis is in order.
Urban land should be treated as a resource to be developed and
conserved for its value to society's basic economic and social well-
being. To this end, government should have primary responsibil-
ity, in the same manner as in education and other services, for con-
trolling the mechanisms of the land market and for maximizing its
public utility. Public ownership of land, by a land bank, could be
a viable means for achieving this control. To advocate land bank-
ing, however, is neither to advocate socialization of land, nor even
to espouse a particularly radical notion. As Professor Roberts points
out:
Within the traditions of property law... there is nothing partic-
ularly radical in visualizing land being owned by the sovereign and
being channelled out to persons who would hold it only as long as
they performed the requisite duties which went with the land. In
this instance, of course, instead of knighthood service, the land-
holder would have to hold and use his parcel according to the pur-
poses set forth in the regional or state-wide master plan.351
Land banking, of course, is not a panacea to all the urban ills
which beset our nation, nor is it even a well-tested method of ac-
complishing the specific objectives for which it aims. It is, how-
ever, firmly grounded on the lessons we have learned from the land
use mistakes of the past and represents a promising means of achiev-
ing a more liveable urban environment.
RICHARD P. FiSHMAN
ROBERT D. GROSS
351 Roberts, supra note 7, at 43.
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